A Critical Appraisal of Remedies in the EU Microsoft Cases by Economides, Nicholas - NYU Stern School of Business & Lianos, Ioannis - University College London
02-ECONOMIDES & LIANOS.DOC 5/11/2010 11:53:47 AM 
 
A CRITICAL APPRAISAL OF REMEDIES IN 
THE E.U. MICROSOFT CASES 
Nicholas Economides*   
Ioannis Lianos† 
We discuss and compare the remedies from the European 
Union’s two cases against Microsoft.  The first E.U. case 
(“E.U. Microsoft I”) alleged that Microsoft illegally bundled 
the Windows Media Player with Windows and that Microsoft 
did not provide adequate documentation that would allow 
full interoperability between Windows servers and non-
Microsoft servers, as well as between Windows clients and 
non-Microsoft servers.  After finding Microsoft liable and 
imposing a large fine, the E.U. imposed as remedies two 
requirements on Microsoft: (1) to sell a version of Windows 
without Windows Media Player (“Windows-N”) and (2) to 
publish and license interoperability information.  Windows-N 
was a commercial failure, and there has been only limited 
cross-platform server entry.  In its second investigation of 
Microsoft (“E.U. Microsoft II”), the E.U. alleged illegal tying 
of Internet Explorer with Windows.  The E.U. settled with 
Microsoft by having them accept the “choicescreen proposal”: 
an obligation to ask consumers whose computers have 
Internet Explorer pre-installed to choose a browser from a 
menu of competing browsers through compulsory Windows 
updates.  Thus, the E.U. imposed quite different remedies in 
the two cases: an unbundling remedy for the Windows Media 
Player but close to a must-carry requirement for Internet 
Explorer.  We analyze and compare the different approaches. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
In 2004, the European Commission (Commission) adopted 
a decision declaring that Microsoft had violated Article 82 of 
the EC Treaty (now Article 102 Treaty on the Functioning of 
the European Union)1 by committing two abuses of its 
 
1 Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU), art. 102, 
May 9, 2008, 2008 O.J. (C 115) 47.  Article 102 prohibits the abuse of a 
dominant position by one or more undertakings in a relevant market when 
there is an affectation of trade between member states. 
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dominant position on the market for PC operating systems 
(E.U. Microsoft I).2  Microsoft was held to have abused its 
dominant position by refusing to supply competitors with 
certain interoperability information and to allow them to use 
it for the purpose of developing and distributing competing 
products on the market for work group server operating 
systems.  It also found that Microsoft had infringed Article 
102 TFEU by making the supply of its client PC operating 
system Windows conditional on the simultaneous acquisition 
of its Windows Media Player.  The General Court  (formerly 
Court of First Instance3) affirmed the decision of the 
Commission in 2007.4 
Following complaints in December 2007 by Opera, the 
Norwegian Internet browser maker, the Commission 
initiated investigations and sent a Statement of Objection 
(“SO”) in January 2009.5  The SO alleged a violation by 
Microsoft of Article 102 TFEU for tying its web browser, 
“Internet Explorer,” to its dominant client PC operating 
system, “Windows.”  On October 7, 2009, the Commission 
gave its preliminary approval to the choicescreen proposal 
and opened it to testing and feedback.6  On December 16, the 
Commission accepted the final choicescreen proposal.7 
 
2 Case COMP/C-3/37.792 Microsoft, Commission Decision of 24 Mar. 
2004, available at http://ec.europa.eu/competition/antitrust/cases/decisions 
/37792/en.pdf (E.U. Microsoft I). 
3 The Treaty of Lisbon renamed the Court of First Instance as the 
General Court.  See Treaty on European Union as Amended by the Treaty 
of Lisbon (TEU), art. 19(1), May 9, 2008, 2008 O.J. (C 115) 13. 
4 Case T-201/04, Microsoft Corp. v. Commission, 2007 E.C.R. II-3601. 
5 See Press Release, Eur. Comm’n, Antitrust: Commission Confirms 
Sending a Statement of Objections to Microsoft on the Tying of Internet 
Explorer to Windows (Jan. 17, 2009). 
6 See Press Release, Eur. Comm’n, Antitrust: Commission Market 
Tests Microsoft's Proposal to Ensure Consumer Choice of Web Browsers; 
Welcomes Further Improvements in Field of Interoperability (Oct. 7, 
2009). 
7 See Case COMP/C-3/39.530 Microsoft, Commission Decision of 16 
Dec. 2009, available at http://ec.europa.eu/competition/antitrust/cases/ 
decisions/39530/final_decision_en.pdf (E.U. Microsoft II).  Microsoft’s 
commitments are included in the Annex of the Commission’s decision 
(“Commitments”).  In the final settlement, Microsoft made additional 
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This study will focus on the remedies that were adopted 
by the Commission and confirmed by the General Court in 
E.U. Microsoft I as well as those suggested by Microsoft in 
E.U. Microsoft II.  It will not examine the liability issue or 
the specific substantive standards for the finding of an abuse 
of dominant position in E.U. competition law.8  Although 
there will be several references to the remedial strategies 
adopted in the United States for practices that were closely 
related to those condemned in the European Microsoft case, 
this study will also not systematically compare the United 
States remedy with the E.U. remedy.  The reason for this is 
that each remedy addressed a different competition law 
problem, and therefore required the adoption of different 
measures to address that problem. 
The study starts by discussing the aim of competition law 
remedies, before examining the roots of the Microsoft case in 
Europe and the consequent choice of a remedial approach by 
the Commission and the Court.  It then explores the 
effectiveness of the remedies in achieving the aims that were 
set.  The non-consideration of the structural remedy in the 
European case and the pros and cons of developing such a 
remedy in the future are briefly discussed before more 
emphasis is put on alternative remedies (competition and 
non-competition law ones) that have been suggested in the 
literature.  The study concludes by discussing the fit between 
the remedy and the theory of consumer harm that led to the 
finding of liability and questions a total dissociation between 
the two (arguing for a principle of remedial proportionality).  
We believe that it is important to think seriously about 
potential remedies before litigation begins.  However, we do 
 
commitments on interoperability between rivals’ software and its own, 
including Windows, Windows Server, Office, Exchange, and SharePoint.  
See Press Release, Microsoft Corp., Microsoft Statement on European 
Commission Decision (December 16, 2009), available at http://www. 
microsoft.com/presspass/press/2009/dec09/12-16statement.mspx. 
8 See Nicholas Economides & Ioannis Lianos, The Elusive Antitrust 
Standard on Bundling in Europe and in the United States in the 
Aftermath of the Microsoft Cases, 76 ANTITRUST L.J. 483 (2009) (discussing 
tying in Microsoft). 
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not require an ex ante identification of an appropriate 
remedy by the plaintiffs, since this could lead to 
underenforcement or overenforcement. 
II.   THE AIM OF COMPETITION LAW REMEDIES 
Competition law remedies are adopted with the aim, 
among others, to restore competition in the market.9  This 
includes not only the “micro” goals of putting the 
infringement to an end, compensating the victims,10 and 
curing the particular impediment to competition, but also 
the “macro” goal of putting incentives in place “so as to 
minimize the recurrence of just such anticompetitive 
conduct.”11  This study embraces a broader view of the 
concept of remedies than Council Regulation 1/2003 on the 
implementation of the rules on competition laid down in 
Articles 81 and 82 of the Treaty.  According to Article 7 of 
the Regulation, the aim of competition law remedies is “to 
bring such infringement effectively to an end.”12  Remedies 
can therefore be distinguished from sanctions against 
undertakings, as the latter have the aim to punish the 
infringer and to provide compensation to victims or society in 
general.13  This distinction, however, does not adequately 
 
9 See generally A. Douglas Melamed, Afterword: The Purposes of 
Antitrust Remedies, 76 ANTITRUST L.J. 359 (2009). 
10 See Robert Pitofsky, Antitrust at the Turn of the Twenty-First 
Century: The Matter of Remedies, 91 GEO. L.J. 169, 170 (2002) (stating 
that taking illegal gains from violators and “restor[ing] those monies to the 
victims” constitutes a principal goal of competition law remedies). 
11 Eleanor Fox, Remedies and the Courage of Convictions in a 
Globalized World: How Globalization Corrupts Relief, 80 TUL. L. REV. 571, 
573 (2005). 
12 Council Regulation 1/2003, art. 7, 2003 O.J. (L 1) 1 [hereinafter 
Council Regulation]. 
13 See OECD, Remedies and Sanctions in Abuse of Dominance Cases, 
DAF/COMP (2006) 19, at 18 (May 2007), available at http://www. 
oecd.org/dataoecd/20/17/38623413.pdf (“Typically, remedies aim to stop a 
violator’s unlawful conduct, its anticompetitive effects, and their 
recurrence, as well as to restore competition. Sanctions are usually meant 
to deter unlawful conduct in the future, to compensate victims, and to 
force violators to disgorge their illegal gains.”). 
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take into account that both sanctions and remedies affect the 
incentives of the wrongdoers’ in their future behavior on the 
market and thus may lead to the restoration of competition.  
Thus, this study adopts a broader view of remedies,  
including stopping the illegal conduct and preventing its 
recurrence, restoring competition, deterrence, just 
compensation, and disgorgement of illicit profits.  This 
overall approach provides a more useful framework for 
analyzing the effect of competition law on the specific 
market.  Furthermore, the restrictive position adopted in 
Regulation 1/2003 concerns public enforcement and does not 
take into account the emerging role of private enforcement in 
E.U. competition law. 
Remedies seek generally to restore “the plaintiff’s rightful 
position, that is, to the position that the plaintiff would have 
occupied if defendant had never violated the law . . . [or] to 
restore the defendants to the defendant’s rightful position, 
that is, the position that the defendant would have occupied 
absent the violation.”14  In other words, remedies are a cure 
to a “wrong” the defendant committed either “in 
contravention of some legally-recognised right of the 
plaintiff’s”15 or to a category of right-recipients the legislator 
aimed to protect (e.g., final or intermediate consumers).  The 
wrong of the defendant gives rise to the enforceable right of 
the plaintiff (or the protected category) to impose on the 
defendant a correlative duty of stopping the illegal behavior, 
paying damages, making restitution, or adopting a specific 
behavior.  Article 7 of Regulation 1/2003 does not oppose this 
conceptualization of remedies, as it links the adoption of a 
remedy to the end of the infringement, a concept that might 
be understood narrowly as the termination of the illegal 
conduct, but also more broadly as outcome-oriented, thus 
requiring the reversal of the effects of the illegal conduct. 
Therefore, an important aspect in defining remedies is 
determining who would be the beneficiary of this right; in 
 
14 DOUGLAS LAYCOCK, MODERN AMERICAN REMEDIES: CASES AND 
MATERIALS 2 (1994). 
15 MICHAEL TILBURY, MICHAEL NOONE & BRUCE KERCHER, REMEDIES: 
COMMENTARY AND MATERIALS 1 (3d ed. 2000). 
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other words, who is the protected category with the right to 
impose a correlative duty on the defendant.  We will assume 
that the protected category for competition law remedies is 
the consumers of the relevant market harmed by the “wrong” 
committed by the defendant.16  A wider perspective would be 
to consider that the protected category consists of the 
“broader public” who derives benefits from the principle of 
competition, allegedly jeopardized by the competition law 
violation.  This approach has been taken by the General 
Court and the European Court of Justice in some recent 
decisions.17  
Whichever perspective is chosen, “restoring competition” 
should not be interpreted as reaching perfect competition (or 
free competition if one takes a deontological perspective), 
which is practically unattainable, and in some cases 
normatively undesirable from a public policy perspective.18   
 
16 In this case, consumer welfare or consumer sovereignty will be 
proxies of consumer harm. 
17 See Op. Advocate Gen., Case C-8/08, T-Mobile Netherlands BV v. 
Raad van bestuur van de Nederlandse Mededingingsautoriteit, ¶¶ 58, 71 
(Feb. 19, 2009), available at http://eurlex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUri-
Serv.do?uri=CELEX:62008C0008:EN:HTML (defending the view that the 
objective of E.U. Competition law is to “protect . . . competition as such” 
because this is of benefit, not only for consumers but for “the public at 
large.”).  In the judgment, the court accepted that “Article 81 EC, like the 
other competition rules of the Treaty, is designed to protect not only the 
immediate interests of individual competitors or consumers but also to 
protect the structure of the market and thus competition as such,” but did 
not adopt the position of AG Kokott with regard to the ultimate 
beneficiaries of the principle of competition.  Case C-8/08, T-Mobile 
Netherlands BV v. Raad van bestuur van de Nederlandse 
Mededingingsautoriteit, ¶ 38 (June 4, 2009), available at http://eurlex. 
europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:62008J0008:EN:HTML.  
This suggests that a possible interpretation of the aims of E.U. 
Competition law is the avoidance of a long-term consumer harm.  See id. 
¶ 36. 
18 In industries with significant network effects, even in the absence of 
anticompetitive actions, the natural equilibrium is neither perfect 
competition nor an egalitarian market structure.  Markets with strong 
network effects, such as the market for operating systems of PCs, are 
‘‘winner-take-most’’ markets with significant market share and profits 
inequality as well as high concentration.  Thus, the but-for world that 
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The remedy aims to restore the market conditions that 
would have existed in the absence of the conduct found 
illegal (commonly called the “but for” market conditions). 
Competition law remedies also have a prophylactic 
objective: “[to] ensure that there remain no practices likely to 
result in monopolization in the future.”19  This is certainly a 
difficult enterprise that requires courts to conduct a 
counterfactual analysis of the situation in the market, both 
with and without the specific competition law violations.  
This is particularly difficult in complex and dynamically 
evolving markets, where static models cannot easily predict 
the situation that would have existed absent the restraint.  
It also requires a difficult decision on the appropriate 
enforcement mechanism for the remedy, as the judge must 
decide on the degree of her personal involvement in the 
operation compared to the use of market forces or regulatory 
institutions.  The process of designing appropriate remedies 
is, perhaps, primarily a decision that regulatory interference 
is necessary in order to bring the self-correcting forces of the 
market back to their usual operation, since it is the default 
mechanism to adjust the incentives of market actors and 
therefore the interaction between supply and demand in a 
specific sector of the economy.  Thus, remedies could be 
either (i) setting up conditions for the market to work or (ii) 
directly influencing or guiding the market. 
 
would have existed in the absence of anti-competitive actions is one of very 
significant inequality. Attempting to impose the perfectly competitive 
egalitarian environment of a non-network industry can lead to lower social 
benefits. See Nicholas Economides, The Economics of Networks, 14 INT’L J. 
INDUS. ORG. 675, 683 (1996), available at http://www.stern.nyu.edu/ 
networks/Economides_Economics_of_Networks.pdf; Nicholas Economides, 
Competition Policy in Network Industries: An Introduction, in THE NEW 
ECONOMY AND BEYOND: PAST, PRESENT AND FUTURE 96 (Dennis W. Jansen 
ed., 2006), available at http://www.stern.nyu.edu/networks/Economides 
_Competition_Policy.pdf; Nicholas Economides & Fredrick Flyer, 
Compatibility and Market Structure for Network Goods (Stern Sch. Bus., 
N.Y.U., Discussion Paper EC-98-02, Nov. 1997), available at http://www. 
stern.nyu.edu/networks/98-02.pdf. 
19 See United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34, 103 (D.C. Cir. 
2001). 
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There are, of course, different choices that can be made 
and combined in order to affect the incentives of market 
actors and restore “competition,” which this study, assuming 
a consumer-driven competition law and policy, defines as the 
best possible outcome for the consumers of the specific 
relevant market in terms of price, quality, variety, and 
innovation.  First, it is possible to contract out the remedy to 
other affected market participants by enabling them to sue 
for (1) the recuperation of the damages suffered because of 
the conduct found illegal or (2) for more than the damages 
incurred in order to deter market participants from adopting 
a similar anticompetitive conduct in the future.  Second, it is 
possible to develop remedies that would affect market 
participants’ autonomy in their operation of their business, 
and consequently their incentives.  The latter could be 
conceived as a continuum ranging from remedies that 
preserve some degree of discretion for market participants 
(like contractual remedies, such as commitments) to purely 
non-voluntary schemes, unilaterally imposed by the public 
authorities.  One could also distinguish remedies that relate 
to the conduct of the market participants and attempt to 
affect their incentives to adopt a specific form of conduct (by 
creating disincentives such as fines, or more harshly, by 
imposing injunctions, interdictions, or conduct remedies) 
from more intrusive remedies that affect the infringing 
company’s assets (structural remedies20) or the 
management’s status (criminal sanctions).21 
 
20 Article 7 of Council Regulation 1/2003 traditionally distinguishes 
between structural and behavioral remedies, without providing a 
definition for each of these two concepts.  See Council Regulation, supra 
note 12.  But see Per Hellström, DG Competition, Remedies under Article 
82 EC,  http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/hearings/single_firm/docs/222446 
.htm (last visited Apr. 9, 2010), defining a structural remedy (including 
divestiture of a controlling stake, of a business unit, of a package of assets, 
or of a long-term exclusive license) as: 
a measure that effectively changes the structure of the 
market by a transfer of property rights regarding tangible 
or intangible assets, including the transfer of an entire 
business unit, that does not lead to any ongoing 
relationships between the former and the future owner. 
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III. DESIGNING OPTIMAL REMEDIES AND THE 
ROOTS OF THE MICROSOFT PROBLEM IN 
EUROPE 
The design of optimal remedies requires a clear 
identification of the competition law problem that the 
antitrust remedy is attempting to address.  It may be that 
competition authorities and courts develop different 
remedial strategies for analogous fact patterns because the 
competition law problems that were identified as the source 
of consumer harm in the liability phase of the decision are 
different.  This study builds on the assumption that 
consumers should be at the center of the attention of 
competition law enforcers, not only at the liability phase of 
the decision, but also at the remedy phase. 
Whenever there is a finding of a competition law violation 
there is always a consumer harm story in the background, a 
narrative of consumer harm that is built on specific 
 
After its completion, a structural remedy should not 
require any further monitoring. 
The distinction between structural and behavioral remedies is not, 
however as clear-cut as Regulation 1/2003 suggests.  In its Merger 
Remedies Study, the European Commission set aside the distinction 
between structural and behavioral remedies and adopted a wider 
classification that distinguished remedies involving the transfer of a 
market position, those involving exit from a joint venture and remedies 
relating to access granting.  See DG COMPETITION, EUROPEAN COMMISSION, 
MERGER REMEDIES STUDY 17–19 (2005), available at http://ec.europa.eu/ 
competition/mergers/legislation/remedies_study.pdf;  see also Gotz Drautz, 
Remedies under the Merger Regulation, in ANNUAL PROCEEDINGS OF THE 
FORDHAM CORPORATE LAW INSTITUTE 219, 225 (Barry Hawk ed., 1996) 
(noting that “the distinction between these two types of remedies is not a 
clear bright line and, in fact, it appears that the line has been ‘moving’ 
over time” and offering examples of hybrid (mixed) remedies involving 
both structural and behavioral elements). 
21 Criminal sanctions are imposed on individuals, as opposed to 
undertakings, excluding the circumstances when individuals might be also 
qualified as undertakings under Article 101 or 102 TFEU.  See generally 
Peter Whelan, A Principled Argument for Personal Criminal Sanctions as 
Punishment Under EC Cartel Law, 4 COMPETITION L. REV. 7 (2007); 
Wouter Wills, Is Criminalization of EU Competition Law the Answer?, 28 
WORLD COMPETITION L. & ECON. REV. 117 (2005). 
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inferences from the facts of the case and that is established 
by different types of evidence.  In order to understand and 
assess the remedies adopted in the Microsoft case, we need 
to unravel the narrative of consumer harm that led to the 
adoption of these specific remedies.  Additionally, often 
actions can be identified as having an anticompetitive effect, 
but the quantification of that effect is much more difficult.  
Thus, a full restoration of the market to the “but for” world 
may be unfeasible.  Often all that can be done is to eliminate 
the impediments to competition that resulted from 
anticompetitive actions. 
In Europe, there were two dominant narratives of 
anticompetitive effect in E.U. Microsoft I: first, an issue of 
lack of interoperability and compatibility that allegedly 
harmed consumers; second, a story of illegal tying of 
Windows with Windows Media Player.22  Both stories relate 
to the business strategy of Microsoft to integrate different 
applications in its Windows platform, which was also the 
source of Microsoft’s troubles in the United States.23  
However, there are different views on the anticompetitive 
effects of this strategy of integration.  While in the United 
States the main “story” of anticompetitive harm was that 
Microsoft was essentially attempting to preserve the 
dominance of the Windows’ platform,24 in Europe the 
Commission and the Court perceived Microsoft’s strategy as 
essentially being focused on the application part of the 
business, where it attempted to extend its dominant position 
through the network effects of its platform.25  The different 
 
22 E.U. Microsoft I, supra note 2, ¶ 545. 
23 In the United States, some of the main issues were: (1) integration 
of Internet Explorer into the Windows Operating System, see United 
States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34, 64 (D.C. Cir. 2001), and (2) illegal 
tying of Internet Explorer with Windows, id. at 84. 
24 The leveraging attempted monopolization part of the browser 
market claim was not successful.  See id. at 80–81. 
25 Case T-201/04, Microsoft Corp. v. Commission, 2007 E.C.R. II-3601, 
¶¶ 1288, 1327, 1344 (“[I]t must be borne in mind at the outset that the two 
abuses at issue form part of a leveraging infringement, consisting in 
Microsoft’s use of its dominant position on the client PC operating systems 
market to extend that dominant position to two adjacent markets, namely 
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narratives of anticompetitive effect justified the choice of a 
different remedial strategy. 
Institutional differences between Europe and the United 
States may also explain the different remedy mixture in each 
jurisdiction.  Fines are frequently imposed in Europe, while 
civil remedies (fines) are unavailable in the United States for 
infringements of §§ 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act; furthermore, 
private enforcement and damages actions are less frequent 
in Europe than in the United States.  Although the 
beneficiaries are different for fines than for damages actions 
(taxpayers for the first, consumers for the second), there is a 
close relation between civil sanctions and damages from a 
deterrence perspective, as both forms of relief increase the 
overall cost of being caught. 
The alleged narrative of anticompetitive effect is 
intrinsically related to the imposition of a specific duty to the 
defendant to cure the wrong the defendant committed.  It 
therefore affects the mixture of the different types of 
remedies adopted.  In some cases, that will require the 
adoption of a specific duty to act (conduct remedies).  In 
other cases, it will entail a substitutionary (pecuniary) 
remedy, often when it is difficult or impossible to cure all the 
negative effects of the practice on the protected category with 
conduct remedies. 
A. Specific (Conduct) Remedies 
The Commission adopted conduct remedies for both 
anticompetitive practices of Microsoft.  These remedies 
should respect the usual requirements of proportionality26 
 
the market for work group server operating systems and the market for 
streaming media players.”). 
26 Case 15/83, Denkavit Nederland BV v. Hoofproduktschap voor 
Akkerbouwprodukten, 1984 E.C.R. 2171, ¶ 25; Case C-331/88, The Queen 
v. Minister of Agric., Fisheries and Food ex parte Fedesa, 1990 E.C.R. I-
4023, ¶ 13; Case C-354/95, The Queen v. Minister of Agric., Fisheries & 
Food ex parte Nat’l Farmers’ Union, 1997 E.C.R. I-4559, ¶¶ 49, 50. The 
main aspects of the principle are that the measures should (1) be 
appropriate to achieve the legitimate aim in question (finality test), (2) be 
no more onerous that is required to achieve that aim  (necessity test), and 
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and the existence of a relation between the remedy and the 
infringement that has been established.27  The first remedy 
addressed the interoperability/compatibility issue, the 
second the tying/leveraging issue. 
1. Interoperability/Compatibility 
The Commission found that Microsoft had refused to 
provide Sun with information enabling it to design work 
group server operating systems which could seamlessly 
integrate in the “Active Directory domain architecture,” a 
web of interrelated client-PC-to-server and server-to-server 
protocols that organize Windows work group networks.  
Microsoft’s refusal to provide interoperability to Sun was 
found to be part of a broader pattern of refusing 
interoperability to any vendor of work group server 
operating systems.  Microsoft developed this strategy after it 
had, for a certain period of time, provided the necessary 
information for previous versions of Microsoft’s products to 
Sun and to the industry at large.  The Commission found 
that this disruption of previous levels of supply eliminated 
competition in the relevant market for work group server 
operating systems, as this information was indispensable for 
competitors operating in that market.28  
According to the Commission, Microsoft attempted to 
leverage the quasi-monopoly power it had in the operating 
system market to the work group server market.29  Due to 
network effects, Windows is an indispensable platform for 
most applications.  The Commission found evidence that 
there was a link between the enhanced interoperability of 
Microsoft’s group server operating systems relative to 
competing group server operating systems, and the rapid 
 
(3) be the least onerous, if there is a choice of equally effective measures 
(less restrictive alternative test). 
27 Joined Cases 6 & 7/73, Instituto Chemioterapico Italiano S.p.A & 
Commercial Solvents Corp. v. Commission, 1974 E.C.R. 223, ¶ 45; Case T-
170/06, Alrosa Co. v. Commission, 2007 E.C.R. II-2601, ¶ 131. 
28 E.U. Microsoft I, supra note 2, ¶¶ 584, 692.  
29 Id. ¶ 772. 
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rise to dominance of Microsoft’s applications in the group 
server operating system market.30  The Commission 
proceeded even further and argued that Microsoft’s actions 
had caused consumer harm, claiming that because of 
Microsoft’s refusal to provide interoperability, competitors 
were not able to provide new and enhanced products to 
consumers.31  However, the Commission did not provide any 
evidence that projects to develop new products had not been 
carried out because of Microsoft’s conduct.  The Commission 
proceeded to a qualitative balancing of the incentives of 
Microsoft and its competitors to innovate in the marketplace 
and concluded that Microsoft had committed an abuse of a 
dominant position sanctioned under Article 102.32  According 
to the Commission, imposing a duty to provide 
interoperability would not reduce Microsoft’s incentives to 
innovate (because this is the way competition takes place in 
this industry), and would preserve the incentives of 
Microsoft’s competitors to innovate.33  
In adopting its conclusion on Microsoft’s liability, the 
Commission was indirectly influenced by the existence of 
previous case law addressing problems of interoperability in 
the software sector.34  In fact, although the decision of the 
Commission targeted the refusal of interoperability by 
Microsoft to Sun, it is clear from the general description of 
the competition law problem with which the Commission 
was confronted that it envisioned the issue of 
interoperability more broadly than the confines of the facts 
of the specific case.  For example, the Commission referred to 
 
30 Id. ¶ 781. 
31 Id. ¶¶ 694, 782. 
32 For analysis, see Ioannis Lianos, Competition Law and Intellectual 
Property Rights: Is the Property Rights’ Approach Right?, in CAMBRIDGE 
YEARBOOK OF EUROPEAN LEGAL STUDIES 153 (John Bell & Claire Kilpatrick 
eds., 2006). 
33 E.U. Microsoft I, supra note 2, ¶ 725. 
34 Id. ¶¶ 736–42 (citing Commission Case IV/29.479, IBM (recognizing 
that “active disclosure of intellectual property-protected information and 
licensing of intellectual property could be necessary to allow for 
interoperability”)).  Id. ¶ 740. 
02-ECONOMIDES & LIANOS.DOC 5/11/2010  11:53:47 AM 
360 COLUMBIA BUSINESS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 2010 
the strong network effects that existed in this market and 
made it far more difficult for Microsoft’s competitors to 
contest Microsoft’s dominance in the platform and 
application parts of its business.  The Commission also 
emphasized the “strong commercial and technical associative 
links” between the PC operating system market and the 
work group server operating system market which make it 
so that “Microsoft’s dominance over the PC operating system 
market has a significant impact on the adjacent market for 
operating systems for work group servers.”35  This 
observation communicates the idea that the competition 
problem confronting the Commission was structural 
(relating to the nature of the market and the existence of 
barriers to entry) and that therefore the development of a set 
of remedies that would address the problem of 
interoperability at its core were necessary. 
The Commission referred to previous industry practice, in 
particular the license agreement with AT&T relating to the 
disclosure of portions of the Windows source code,36 to 
previous decisional practice, such as the IBM precedent,37 
and to the existing regulatory framework in the software 
sector as specific illustrations of the need to establish 
interoperability.  Indeed, the EC Software Directive adopted 
in 199138 restricted the exercise of copyright over software 
(including exercise by non-dominant undertakings) for 
interoperability reasons and explicitly provided that its 
provisions were without prejudice to the application of 
Article 102, including when a dominant undertaking refused 
to make available information which is necessary for 
 
35 E.U. Microsoft I, supra note 2, ¶¶ 526, 532; Case T-201/04, 
Microsoft Corp. v. Commission, 2007 E.C.R. II-3601 ¶ 526. 
36 E.U. Microsoft I, supra note 2, ¶ 211. 
37 Commission Case IV/29.479, IBM, available at http://www.cptech. 
org/at/ibm/ibm1984ec.html. 
38 Council Directive 91/250/EEC, Legal Protection of Computer 
Programs, 1991 O.J. (L 122) 42, now replaced by Council Directive 
2009/24/EC, Legal Protection of Computer programs, 2009 O.J. (L 111) 16. 
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interoperability.39  The need to guarantee interoperability is 
an important feature of both industry practice and 
regulation of the software sector. 
The main objective of the remedy created by the 
Commission was thus to restore interoperability, at least to 
the same degree that existed on the market before the 
alleged disruption by Microsoft of the previous supply of 
information.  This raised two difficulties. 
First, the Commission had to define the requisite degree 
of interoperability.  This is an issue linked to both the 
liability and the remedy parts of the decision.  Microsoft 
argued that it already provided some form of 
interoperability, but the Commission found this to be 
insufficient, as this degree of interoperability was still 
providing an advantage to Microsoft’s work group server 
operating systems.40  The issue could be framed as a platform 
neutrality problem: here, a platform owner also provided 
complementary goods or services (applications) which relied 
on the platform and which competed with other applications.  
Had Microsoft not provided full (or native) interoperability to 
its own work group server operating systems, after providing 
the same degree of interoperability in the past with 
competing applications, most likely the Commission would 
not have found a violation of Article 102 TFEU.  The 
Commission understood interoperability in relative (not 
absolute) terms, requiring the same level of interoperability 
in systems composed of components of different companies 
than that achieved between the components of the same 
platform, if this is controlled by a dominant undertaking.  
This created a paradox as the Active Directory did not exist 
in the past (before Windows 2000) and Microsoft had not 
provided interoperability information in the past.  Rather, 
Microsoft provided a license to the source code of Windows 
itself, for others (mainly AT&T) to use to build bridges 
 
39 Council Directive 91/250/EEC, supra note 38, recital 24; Council 
Directive 2009/24/EC, supra note 38, recital 17; see also Case T-201/04, 
Microsoft Corp. v. Commission, 2007 E.C.R. II-3601, ¶ 763. 
40 E.U. Microsoft I, supra note 2, ¶¶ 691, 781. 
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between UNIX and Windows.41  But providing Windows 
source code was not what the Commission wanted Microsoft 
to do. 
The disclosure requirement that the Commission imposed 
on Microsoft applied prospectively to future generations of 
Microsoft’s products, thus implying that Microsoft should 
update the disclosed information each time it brought to 
market new versions of its products.42  The aim of the remedy 
was clearly to enhance the ability of Microsoft’s competitors 
to “develop products that interoperate with the Windows 
domain architecture . . . and hence viably compete with 
Microsoft’s work group server operating system.”43 
Second, the Commission had to decide the institutional 
arrangement that would best achieve the required degree of 
interoperability.  This issue relates to the implementation 
mechanism for the remedy, which raised important 
difficulties in this case.  Article 7 of the Commission’s 
liability decision required Microsoft to submit a proposal to 
the Commission “for the establishment of a suitable 
mechanism assisting the Commission in monitoring 
Microsoft Corporation’s compliance.”  The complexity of the 
decision, and in particular the need to constantly verify the 
accuracy and completeness of the information provided by 
Microsoft, as well as the need to provide adequate 
information on specifications, requires, in some 
circumstances, the inspection of Microsoft’s source code in 
order to resolve any issue of accuracy and completeness of 
the specifications disclosed.  The Commission thus decided to 
appoint a monitoring trustee.44  The monitoring trustee was 
 
41 Id. ¶ 211. 
42 Id. ¶ 1002. 
43 Id. ¶ 1003. 
44 E.U. Microsoft I, supra note 2,  art. 7.  The Commission appointed 
as Monitoring Trustee Professor Neil Barrett, a computer scientist, from a 
shortlist of four experts submitted by Microsoft in October 2005.  See Press 
Release, Eur. Comm’n, Competition: Commission Appoints Trustee to 
Advise on Microsoft’s Compliance with 2004 Decision (May 10, 2005), 
http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=IP/05/1215&form
at=HTML&aged=0&language=EN&guiLanguage=en (last visited Apr. 9, 
2010). 
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asked to adopt a proactive, rather than reactive, role in 
enforcing the interoperability, as well as the tying, part of 
the decision.45 The compliance process for the 
interoperability part of the decision faced difficulties that led 
to a number of exchanges between the Commission and 
Microsoft and eventually a number of Article 24 Regulation 
1/2003 penalty decisions.46  
Following the judgment of the General Court confirming 
the Commission findings on Microsoft’s liability for refusing 
to supply interoperability and tying,47 Microsoft agreed with 
the Commission to alter a certain number of the conditions 
in its license agreements regarding the provision of 
interoperability information (the October 2007 Neelie Kroes-
Steve Ballmer agreement).48 Two months later, the 
 
45 E.U. Microsoft I, supra note 2, ¶ 1046.  The European Commission’s 
decision had the advantage of intervening at a later stage when the 
United States experience could have been very instructive for the design of 
the interoperability remedy.  For an excellent account of the United States 
experience, see William H. Page & Seldon J. Childers, Software 
Development as an Antitrust Remedy: Lessons from the Enforcement of the 
Microsoft Communications Protocol Licensing Requirement, 14 MICH. 
TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV. 77 (2007); William H. Page, Mandatory 
Contracting Remedies in the American and European Microsoft Cases (U. 
Fla., Levin C. L. Research Paper No. 2009-22, 2009), available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1073103. 
46 See Council Regulation, supra note 12, art. 24 (stating that where 
an infringement has been established by a previous Commission antitrust 
decision, the commission may impose penalty payments up to five percent 
of the average daily turnover in the proceeding business year per Calendar 
day to compel the company to end the infringement).  Here, the 
Commission first warned Microsoft in November 2005 that it could face a 
daily fine of up to €2 million if it did not comply.  Case COMP/C-3/37.792 
Microsoft, Commission Decision of 10 Nov. 2005, available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/antitrust/cases/decisions/37792/art24_1_de
cision.pdf. The Commission then imposed a €280.5 million fine for non-
compliance.  Case COMP/C-3/37.792 Microsoft, Commission Decision of 12 
July 2006. 
47 See Case T-201/04, Microsoft Corp. v. Commission, 2007 E.C.R. II-
3601. 
48 See William H. Page & Seldon J. Childers, Bargaining in the 
Shadow of the European Microsoft Decision: The Microsoft–SAMBA 
Protocol License, 102 NW. U. L. REV. COLLOQUY 332, 343–44 (2008) 
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Commission supported the conclusion of a licensing 
agreement between Microsoft and Samba (the Protocol 
Freedom Information Agreement, or “PFIF Agreement”).49  
Microsoft was willing to provide, as an annex to the 
agreement, an indication of all the patents it claimed in its 
licensed information and agreed not to sue Samba for 
infringement of any unlisted patent.50  These “patent maps,” 
which have also become a prominent feature of Microsoft’s 
interoperability policy51 provide developers an opportunity to 
attempt to successfully design around the protocols without 
risk of patent infringement.  Microsoft has only included 
patents on the patent map that it believes are necessarily 
infringed by implementation of the protocol.  The Samba 
license constitutes the most important development of the 
E.U. Microsoft Decision’s remedial phase. 
2. Tying 
In comparison to the complex and long-standing 
compliance required by the decision’s interoperability 
component, the conduct remedy imposed with regard to the 
tying violation was relatively straightforward.  The 2004 
Commission Decision took the view that Microsoft had 
violated Article 102 TFEU by attempting to leverage its 
quasi-monopolistic position in the PC operating systems 
market into the media player market.  As explained in the 
Commission’s decision, the United States Judgments did not 
solve that particular anticompetitive problem.52  First, the 
United States proceedings focused only on the maintenance 
 
(discussing this initial agreement in licensing protocols, which eventually 
gave rise to the Microsoft–SAMBA agreement). 
49 PFIF was a nonprofit corporation created by the Software Freedom 
Law Center (SFLC) in order to license the documentation to free or open 
source developers.  The PFIF Agreement made the protocol information 
available to Free Software projects like SAMBA.  See id. at 344–45. 
50 Id. at 347. 
51 See Microsoft Corp., Interoperability Principles Patent Maps, 
http://www.microsoft.com/openspecifications/programs/other/interoperabili
ty-principles-patent-maps/ (last visited Apr. 7, 2010). 
52 See E.U. Microsoft I, supra note 2, ¶¶ 688–91. 
02-ECONOMIDES & LIANOS.DOC 5/11/2010  11:53:47 AM 
No. 2:346] E.U. MICROSOFT REMEDIES 365 
of monopoly argument.  The plaintiffs abandoned the tying 
claim after the Court of Appeals ruled that technological 
tying should be examined under a rule of reason.53  Second, 
because the plaintiffs in the United States did not pursue the 
tying claim, there was no specific remedy included for 
tying:54  the United States judgment provided no means for 
the Original Equipment Manufacturers (“OEMs”) and end-
users to remove Windows Media Player code from the PC 
operating system (as it was technically unfeasible to remove 
the Windows Media Player code without running the risk 
that other parts of the operating system and third party 
products relying on Windows Media Player would not 
function properly).55  The United States court required 
Microsoft to provide OEMs and end users the means to 
remove access (including icons) to the Windows Media Player 
application or to disable automatic launches.56 
The effectiveness of this remedy was limited as only few 
OEMs took advantage of the opportunity to provide 
alternatives to Windows Media Player.57  One could, 
however, argue that taking into account the liability claim, 
which forced OEMs to carry Internet Explorer because they 
 
53 See United States v. Microsoft Corp., 231 F. Supp. 2d 144, 161 
(D.D.C. 2002) (reporting on remand that the government dropped the 
tying charge after the D.C. Circuit remanded for further proceedings on 
that issue). 
54 However, bundling was also of concern in the maintenance of 
monopoly claim.  See United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34, 65 
(D.C. Cir. 2001). 
55 See E.U. Microsoft I, supra note 2, ¶ 798 (citing United States v. 
Microsoft, 231 F. Supp. 2d at 181 n.23); see also State of New York v. 
Microsoft Corp., 224 F. Supp. 2d 76, 308 (D.D.C. 2002) (“Likewise, the 
definition of Windows Operating System Product in the SRPFJ cannot 
curtail the ability of a court to determine that Microsoft has illegally tied 
two products which are separate under the antitrust laws.”).  For a 
discussion on the add/remove utility for middleware, see State of New 
York v. Microsoft Corp., 224 F. Supp. 2d at 202.  Notably, Windows Media 
Player was included in the list of Microsoft middleware products by the 
Court.  Id. at 193. 
56 State of New York v. Microsoft Corp., 224 F. Supp. 2d at 153–55. 
57 WILLIAM H. PAGE & JOHN E. LOPATKA, THE MICROSOFT CASE 215 
(2007). 
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could not exclusively promote other browsers, the remedy 
was fully “successful” in providing them with that option.  
The fact that they may choose not to take advantage of that 
right does not necessarily mean the remedy was 
unsuccessful, unless a “successful” remedy is defined as a 
socially desirable market outcome, which could blur the 
distinction between competition law intervention and 
regulatory alternatives.  The low utilization rate can be 
explained by the fact that unlike Judge Jackson’s remedial 
order, the final consent decree did not require Microsoft to 
charge a lower license fee to OEMs that deleted access to 
Microsoft middleware.58  In addition, the Commission may 
have found this remedy inadequate “because it reinforced the 
applications barrier to entry from which Microsoft benefited 
by encouraging content providers to encode their products in 
Microsoft’s standards.”59 
The Commission imposed a more intrusive remedy on 
Microsoft than had been imposed in the United States case 
for two reasons.  First, the importance of the leveraging 
argument and network effects in the European case and 
second, the Commission’s insistence that freedom of choice 
needed to be restored to consumers that were coerced by 
Microsoft’s conduct to use Windows Media Player as a 
default media player.  The Commission concluded that there 
was coercion in spite of the fact that (1) Windows Media 
Player was offered for free, (2)  there were other ways to 
reach consumers for competing products, and (3) the 
consumers were not forced but simply likely to use Windows 
Media Player.  The extent of the competition problem was of 
a structural nature: the ubiquity of Windows undermined 
competition in media players because of network effects.60  
 
58 Id. at 215–16. 
59 Id. at 218. 
60 E.U. Microsoft I, supra note 2, ¶ 979 (“Through tying with Windows, 
Microsoft uses Windows as a distribution channel to anti-competitively 
ensure for itself a significant competition advantage in the media player 
market.  Competitors, due to Microsoft’s tying, are a priori at a 
disadvantage irrespective of whether their products are potentially more 
attractive on the merits.”). 
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This structural problem deterred innovation and reduced 
consumer choice as competing media players that consumers 
could have preferred were excluded from the market.61 
Thus Microsoft’s distributional advantage led to a more 
intrusive competition law remedy than in the United States 
case, a remedy which affected Microsoft’s freedom to design 
its products.  Article 6 of the Decision required Microsoft to 
offer a version of Windows for client PC which did not 
include Windows Media Player media files but was otherwise 
equally performing. 62  The remedy applied to licenses for 
both end-users and OEMs. Microsoft was also ordered to 
refrain from using “any technological, commercial, 
contractual or any other means which would have the 
equivalent effect of tying Windows Media Player to 
Windows,” for example by selling the new version at a higher 
price than the Windows-with-Windows-Media-Player 
version.63  This did not oblige Microsoft to charge less for the 
Windows-without-Windows-Media-Player version than for 
Windows with Windows Media Player, since most competing 
media players were offered for free. 
In addition, the Decision indicated which activities 
Microsoft could not engage in because those activities had an 
effect equivalent to tying. For example, Microsoft could not 
create privileged interoperability between Windows Media 
Player and Windows or any other favorable treatment to 
Windows, offer conditional discounts, punish or threaten 
OEMs who obtained Windows without Windows Media 
Player, or tie Windows Media Player to other products that 
“would exhibit a similar ubiquity as Windows,” such as 
Microsoft Office.64 The Commission rejected Microsoft’s 
arguments that removing the Windows Media Player would 
 
61 Id. ¶¶ 978–84. 
62 Id. ¶ 1019 (“These files contain the technologies which have been 
identified as bringing about the foreclosure effect by virtue of Windows 
Media Player being tied to Windows, namely the files that support the 
proprietary Microsoft codecs, file formats and DRM formats and the WMP 
user interface.”). 
63 Id. ¶ 1012. 
64 Id. ¶ 1013(v). 
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undermine the integrity of the operating system, because 
any interdependencies between the two products were the 
result of “deliberate choice by Microsoft”65 and the 
integration of Windows Media Player was not a precondition 
for the multimedia capabilities of Windows.66  Microsoft was 
given 90 days to implement the remedy.  The Commission 
rejected Microsoft’s proposal to include other media players 
in Windows (the “must carry” remedy). 
Measured in terms of the number of sales for the 
Windows XP N edition, the remedy was ineffective.  The 
Commission’s hope of widespread adoption of Windows XP N 
and the emergence of new powerful competitors did not 
materialize.67  One could compare the situation of the media 
player market with that of Internet browser market, which 
was the subject of the United States Microsoft case.68  As 
previously explained, after the Court of Appeals’ judgment, 
the tying case was dropped.  By the time of the Court of 
Appeals’ decision, Microsoft commanded an impressive share 
of the Internet browser market (almost ninety percent).  It is 
only recently that Mozilla Firefox, a competing Internet 
browser developed by Netscape in the form of open source 
software in 2004 after Netscape’s defeat in the first browser 
war,69 has been able to challenge Internet Explorer’s 
dominant position, with Internet Explorer’s usage share 
 
65 Id. ¶ 1027. 
66 Id. ¶ 1031 (“Any efficiency implications of code removal would 
weigh heavier if Microsoft had shown that the integration of WMP was a 
precondition for these efficiencies. Microsoft has not provided evidence to 
that effect.”).  The Commission distinguished between two sorts of 
dependencies: “technical dependencies which would by definition lead to 
the non-functioning of the operating system and functional dependencies 
which can be dealt with ‘gracefully.’ ”  Id. ¶ 1033. 
67 There is no doubt that powerful competition existed in Media 
Players before the introduction of Windows-N, as evidenced by the huge 
successes of the iPod and the associated media format, as well as the 
Adobe Flash media player.  
68 United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34 (D.C. Cir. 2001). 
69 See Paul Boutin, Are the Browsers Wars Back?, SLATE, June 30, 
2004, http://slate.msn.com/id/2103152. 
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reduced to 66.1% in the second quarter of 2009.70  The 
situation is different in the media player market, where a 
number of competing programs have developed during the 
same period.  One of the reasons for the faster development 
of competing products in the media player market than in 
the internet browser market might also be the constraint 
and distraction that litigation in Europe placed on 
Microsoft’s management and the effect the decision had on 
Microsoft’s aggressive competitive ethos.71 
B. Substitutionary Remedies 
Substitutionary remedies may take different forms.  For 
example, fines, damages, or disgorgement of illegally 
acquired gains. Like remedies in kind, substitutionary 
 
70 See Microsoft Internet Explorer on Pace to Drop Below 50% Market 
Share by May 2011, MACDAILYNEWS, May 7, 2009, http://macdaily 
news.com/index.php/weblog/comments/21061 (stating that Mozilla Firefox 
had 22.47% of usage share).  According to other reports, the Internet 
Explorer versions had a total of 54.4% market share in July 2009, a 
significant decline from 65.8% in March 2009.  See Erick Schonfeld, Since 
March, Internet Explorer Lost 11.4 Percent Share to Firefox, Safari, and 
Chrome, TECHCRUNCH, July 5, 2009, http://www.techcrunch.com/2009/07/ 
05/since-march-internet-explorer-lost-114-percent-share-to-firefox-safari-a 
nd-chrome.  Apple Safari 4 and Google Chrome have done well since their 
releases as well.  In December 2009, Chrome surpassed Safari.  The 
distribution of market share for browsers in December 2009 was: Internet 
Explorer 62.69%, Firefox 24.63%, Chrome 4.63%, Safari 4.46%, and Opera 
2.31%.  Emil Protalinski, Chrome Grabs Market Share from IE and 
Firefox, Passes Safari, ARS TECHNICA, Jan. 4, 2010, http://arstechnica.com/ 
software/news/2010/01/chrome-grabs-market-share-from-ie-and-firefox-pas 
ses-safari.ars. 
71 See generally GARY L. REBACK, FREE THE MARKET! WHY ONLY 
GOVERNMENT CAN KEEP THE MARKETPLACE COMPETITIVE 24–49 (2009); 
William E. Kovacic, Designing Antitrust Remedies for Dominant Firm 
Misconduct, 31 CONN. L. REV. 1285, 1288–92 (1999) (advancing the 
hypothesis that the existence of an antitrust lawsuit may inhibit 
aggressive commercial behavior by the defendant as well as distract the 
defendant’s employees from more productive functions, thus imposing 
formidable costs on the company).  Nevertheless, Microsoft continued to 
introduce new products in the market, such as Zune (media player 
hardware) and Silverlight (for Internet media playback, like Adobe Flash) 
despite the antitrust action. 
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remedies are designed to return the plaintiff or the protected 
category of right holders to the situation that would have 
existed absent the infringement.  This is achieved through 
compensation of the right holders and/or by restoring 
competition.  For example, the objective of fines is to raise 
the costs of the violation of competition law and therefore 
deter similar conduct in the future by both the company 
receiving the fine and third parties. 
There are two forms of monetary transfers that can be 
used as substitutionary remedies.  They may take the form 
of fines, which are a monetary transfer to the taxpayer, or 
damages, which are a monetary transfer to the “victims” of 
the anticompetitive practice.  In either case, setting an 
optimal level for civil sanctions and damages should take 
into account the interaction of these two forms of 
substitutionary remedies.  The European Commission 
imposed a fine on Microsoft that appeared at first sight to be 
quite large.  However, the fine is small compared to the total 
amount of damages claims and settlements in the United 
States.  Possibly, the amount of fines imposed in the 
European Microsoft case could lead to lower deterrent effects 
than the United States substitutionary remedies. 
1. Fines 
Article 3 of the Commission’s decision imposed on 
Microsoft what appeared at the time to be a record fine in an 
abuse of dominance case.72  The Commission calculated the 
amount of the fines according to the method set in the 
Guidelines on the Method of Setting Fines.73  This included 
two steps: (1) setting the basic amount of the fine by 
reference to the proportion of the value of sales and the 
degree of gravity of the infringement, multiplied by the 
 
72 The current record is the fine recently levied upon Intel by the 
Commission.  See Case COMP/C-3/37.990 Intel, Commission Decision of 13 
May 2009 (imposing a €1.06 billion fine upon Intel). 
73 See generally Commission Guidelines on the Method of Setting 
Fines Imposed Pursuant to Art. 23(2)(a) of Reg. No. 1/2003, 2006 O.J. (C 
210) 2 [hereinafter Guidelines]. 
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number of years of infringement; (2) adjusting that basic 
amount upwards or downwards taking into account a list of 
aggravating or mitigating circumstances.74  The fine reflected 
the gravity of Microsoft’s infringement, a leveraging strategy 
which comprised two separate abuses: a refusal to supply 
and a tying abuse.75  The fact that Microsoft had already 
achieved a dominant or leading position in these industries 
was found a sufficient indication of the gravity of the 
infringement.  The initial amount for the gravity of the 
infringement was set to €162,732,101, without 
distinguishing which amount represented the fine for the 
refusal to supply interoperability infringement and which 
one for the tying infringement.76  This starting amount was 
doubled to ensure “a sufficient deterrent effect on Microsoft,” 
in light of the firm’s significant economic capacity.77  The 
Commission found that the duration of the infringement was 
also particularly long: the refusal to supply abuse lasted six 
years and it was still ongoing at the time of the decision; the 
tying abuse lasted more than 5 years.  Thus the Commission 
increased the basic amount of the fine by fifty percent to 
€497,196,204, taking into account an increase of ten percent 
for each year of participation in the infringement.  As the 
General Court  noted in its decision, the fine represented 
7.5% of Microsoft’s turnover in the market for client PC and 
work-group server operating systems in Europe,78 below the 
ten percent threshold set by the European Commission’s 
Guidelines on the method of setting fines.79  No aggravating 
or attenuating circumstances were found. 
 
74 Id. ¶ 20 (“The assessment of gravity will be made on a case-by-case 
basis for all types of infringement, taking account of all the relevant 
circumstances of the case”). 
75 E.U. Microsoft I, supra note 2, ¶¶ 1061–68. 
76 Id. ¶ 1075. 
77 Id. ¶ 1076 (increasing the fine to €331,464,203). 
78 Case T-201/04, Microsoft Corp. v. Commission, 2007 E.C.R. II-3601, 
¶ 1319. 
79 See Guidelines, supra note 73,  ¶ 32 (“The final amount of the fine 
shall not, in any event, exceed 10% of the total turnover in the preceding 
business year of the undertaking or association of undertakings 
participating in the infringement”). 
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The General Court affirmed the fine imposed by the 
Commission and rejected Microsoft’s arguments that no fine 
should be imposed because the infringements resulted from 
“novel theories of law”80 or that Microsoft had already taken 
measures, following the United States settlement, to provide 
the necessary degree of interoperability.81  The Court found 
that the doubling of the basic amount of the fine by the 
Commission was justified for deterrence reasons: in a 
prescient (given recent developments) paragraph the Court 
noted that “since Microsoft is very likely to maintain its 
dominant position on the client PC operating systems 
market, at least over the coming years, it cannot be 
precluded that it will have other opportunities to use 
leveraging vis-a-vis other adjacent markets.”82 
Although the fine imposed on Microsoft seems 
particularly imposing, its deterrent effect is questionable.  In 
the high technology sector, where network effects may tip 
the market for some time towards a particular technological 
standard, incurring the costs of civil penalties may still be a 
profitable strategy for monopolists where civil penalties are 
not set at a level that fully internalizes the dominant firm’s 
gains (past and future) from the antitrust violation.83  The 
effectiveness of this part of the European remedy should be 
examined in comparison to the pecuniary sanctions imposed 
 
80 Case T-201/04, Microsoft Corp. v. Commission, ¶ 1299. 
81 Id. ¶ 1227. 
82 Id. ¶ 1363. 
83 See William M. Landes, Optimal Sanctions for Antitrust Violations, 
50 U. CHI. L. REV. 652, 656–57 (1983) (showing that violation of antitrust 
laws may be efficient for the infringer when the gains to the infringer 
following the violation exceed the sanctions imposed multiplied by the 
likelihood of apprehension and conviction).  Here, the amount of the fine 
imposed for an antitrust violation is based on an accounting of gains as 
defined and measured at the time of the decision and is, in any case, 
limited to ten percent of the firm’s worldwide turnover.  This amount will 
not necessarily include all future gains arising from the exclusion or 
marginalization of competitors and the maintenance of the monopolistic 
position in the future.  These gains may be particularly important in high 
technology markets where network effects can erect barriers to entry 
leading to entrenched dominant positions for a long period of time. 
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in the United States Microsoft case.  There is no provision for 
civil penalties, such as fines, under the Sherman Act.84  In 
United States antitrust law, pecuniary sanctions take the 
form of wealth transfers to the victims of the exclusionary 
practice, which may engage a private action to collect 
damages.85  Most often, this leads to settlements entered 
between the monopolist and the claimants.86 
The next section will discuss the availability of damages 
and settlements as an effective “pecuniary” remedy.  These 
remedies provide compensation/restitution to the victims of 
the competition law infringement, as well as deter the 
monopolist or dominant firm from adopting similar practices 
in the future by acting indirectly on their incentives. 
2. Damages 
In comparison to the amount of the fines imposed by the 
European Commission, the monetary transfers to consumers 
and competitors affected by Microsoft’s antitrust law 
infringement in the United States case seem particularly 
important.  According to Harry First, more than 220 private 
cases have been filed against Microsoft by consumers and 
rivals.87  “Consumer class actions represent the largest group 
of claims (more than eighty percent), with individuals having 
filed thirty cases and state attorneys general having filed 
 
84 A proposal to amend the law to permit the imposition of civil fines 
has been rejected recently by the Antitrust Modernization Commission. 
See ANTITRUST MODERNIZATION COMM’N, REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
285–91 (2007), available at http://govinfo.library.unt.edu/amc/report_rec 
ommendation/amc_final_report.pdf.  For critical analyses, see Harry First, 
The Case for Antitrust Civil Penalties 76 ANTITRUST L.J. 127 (2009); 
Stephen Calkins, Civil Monetary Remedies Available to Antitrust 
Enforcers, 40 U.S.F. L. REV. 567 (2006). 
85 Clayton Act § 4, 15 U.S.C. § 15 (2006). 
86 See Jeffrey M. Perloff, Daniel L. Rubinfeld & Paul Ruud, Antitrust 
Settlements and Trial Outcomes, 78 REV. ECON. & STAT. 401, 401–09 
(1996). 
87 Harry First, Netscape is Dead: Remedy Lessons from the Microsoft 
Litigation 6 (N.Y.U. Law & Econ. Research Paper No. 08-49, 2008), 
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1260803. 
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two cases on behalf of their non-business citizens.”88  
Individual private plaintiffs had an important hurdle to 
overcome, as they had to prove that they were overcharged 
as a result of Microsoft’s maintenance of monopoly in the 
operating systems market.  As indirect purchasers, they 
were barred from bringing a federal antitrust private 
damages claim,89 and class actions had to pass the procedure 
of class certification.90 
Important difficulties also arose as to whether Microsoft 
overcharged by excluding potential competing platforms in 
the operating systems market.91  The question was what 
would have been the price of Windows had Netscape and 
Java been able to challenge Microsoft’s dominant position 
and develop a competing platform.  Judge Jackson’s decision 
contained some indications that Microsoft was able to charge 
higher prices to Windows 98 upgrades, while lower prices 
would have also been profitable.  However, Judge Jackson 
also recognized that it might be in Microsoft’s interest to 
 
88 Id. 
89 Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois, 431 U.S. 720 (1977). 
90 See PAGE & LOPATKA, supra note 57, at 235 (noting that the majority 
of the courts adopted a liberal standard for class certification). 
91 It remains unclear whether Netscape together with Java posed a 
real threat to Windows.  Netscape’s CEO Jim Barksdale completely 
dismissed that likelihood at trial, stating that Netscape with Java was no 
substitutes for Windows.  See Transcript of Record at 72–75, United States 
v. Microsoft Corp., 84 F. Supp. 2d 9 (D.D.C. 1999) (Civ. No. 98-1232), 
available at http://cyber.law.harvard.edu/msdoj/transcripts/1020b.doc.  
However, internal Microsoft emails presented at trial show that Microsoft 
took this potential threat very seriously.  See Plaintiff’s Joint Proposed 
Finding of Facts ¶ 54, United States v. Microsoft, 84 F. Supp. 2d 9 (D.D.C. 
1999) (Civ. No. 98-1232), available at http://www.justice.gov/atr/cases/f260 
0/2613-1.htm#III (noting that Microsoft viewed Netscape Navigator as a 
threat to its  operating system monopoly as it threatened to reduce the 
applications barrier to entry and to “commoditize” Windows, in the words 
of Bill Gates).  But if Netscape’s success was very unlikely in the absence 
of anticompetitive actions, the remedy should be limited to removing the 
anticompetitive hurdle, and should not extend to restructuring the 
market. 
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“[keep] the price of Windows low today” in order to support 
the growth of the operating system market.92 
Netscape/AOL and Sun, who brought the case against 
Microsoft in the E.U., also filed private damages suits in the 
United States. Netscape settled in 2003, while Sun settled a 
few days after the publication of the decision of the European 
Commission in 2004 and consequently retreated as a third 
party intervener in the European litigation.93  As for other 
Microsoft opponents in the European antitrust case, both 
RealNetworks and Novell settled, with the exception of 
Novell’s pending lawsuit against Microsoft relating to the 
damage suffered by WordPerfect for lack of interoperability 
information.94  In total, the settlements in the United States 
exceeded $3.5 billion.95 
In comparison, the fine imposed by the European 
Commission, which represents only a fraction of the total 
amount of the settlements, seems to lead to under-
deterrence.  This conclusion is reinforced by the absence of 
any private action brought against Microsoft for damages in 
the E.U.  There are two cumulative explanations for this: 
First, private enforcement of E.U. competition law is nascent 
and does not include a system of treble damages or other 
incentives for private actions.96  Second, the heart of the 
 
92 United States v. Microsoft Corp., 84 F. Supp. 2d 9, 27 (D.D.C. 1999). 
However, this argument is not credible given that Microsoft already had 
over ninety percent OS market share. In fact, it is likely that potential 
competition in the OS market drove Microsoft to charge a significantly 
lower price than the unconstrained monopoly price. See generally Nicholas 
Economides, The Microsoft Antitrust Case, 9 J. INDUS., COMPETITION & 
TRADE 1, 7–39 (2001). 
93 Stephen Shankland, Sun Settles with Microsoft, Announces Layoffs, 
CNET NEWS, Apr. 2, 2004, http://news.cnet.com/Sun-settles-with-Microso 
ft,-announces-layoffs/2100-1014_3-5183848.html. 
94 First, supra note 87, at 8–9. 
95 Id. at 27. 
96 See Commision of the European Communities, Commission White 
Paper on Damages Actions for Breach of the EC Antitrust Rules, COM 
(2008) 165 final (Apr. 2, 2008), available at http://eur-lex.europa.eu/ 
LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=COM:2008:0165:FIN:EN:PDF (discussing 
possible options). 
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European case was not maintenance of monopoly, and 
therefore a possible overcharge of Windows, but the 
extension of the monopoly power of Microsoft to the work 
group server and media player markets. 
Concerning the work group server market, it is not clear 
if consumer harm took a different form than just a slower 
pace of innovation (because of the exclusion of competitors), 
or also derived from an increase in the prices charged by 
Microsoft.  In the media player market, the product was 
given for free, so the possible harm to consumers lay not in 
higher prices but in possibly lower quality, as allegedly 
better quality media players were excluded from the market.  
It would, however, be extremely difficult and costly to 
quantify this reduction of quality.97  Because of the limited 
access of European consumers to damages and the 
difficulties in winning damages in the United States because 
of comity concerns (in particular after Empagran98) 
European consumers will not be compensated and, 
consequently, there will be less deterrence.  The weakness of 
private enforcement of competition law in Europe indicates 
that fines should be set at a higher level in order to ensure 
more effective deterrence.99 
 
97 However, during the infringement period there was significant 
innovation and entry of new products such as the iPod and the Adobe 
Flash Player. 
98 F. Hoffmann–La Roche Ltd. v. Empagran S.A., 542 U.S. 155 (2004). 
99 This supposes, however, a clarification of the liability standard 
under Article 102 TFEU. The European Commission has recently adopted 
guidance on its enforcement priorities.  See Communication from the 
Commission: Guidance on the Commission’s Enforcement Priorities in 
Applying Article 82 of the EC Treaty to Abusive Exclusionary Conduct by 
Dominant Undertakings, 2009 O.J. (C 45) 7.  Note the guidance on 
enforcement priorities is a softer law instrument than guidelines; it is 
complementary to the Commission’s specific enforcement decisions. Using 
guidance instead of guidelines offers the Commission more leeway in 
presenting its approach for Article 102.  The Commission could not have 
adopted guidelines contrary to the rulings of the European courts.  See Op. 
Advocate Gen., Case C-8/08, T-Mobile Netherlands BV v. Raad van 
bestuur van de Nederlandse Mededingingsautoriteit (Feb. 19, 2009), 
available at http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CEL 
EX:62008C0008:EN:HTML.  Finally, the Commission maintains the 
02-ECONOMIDES & LIANOS.DOC 5/11/2010  11:53:47 AM 
No. 2:346] E.U. MICROSOFT REMEDIES 377 
IV. DID THE E.U. MICROSOFT CASE REMEDIES 
FAIL? 
The success of the interoperability remedy required a 
sustained and continuing effort of setting and monitoring 
compliance standards, which was particularly difficult in the 
absence of a regulatory authority that could supervise its 
enforcement.  The European Commission initiated the 
mechanism of the Monitoring Trustee, which proved 
particularly useful in the promotion of the SAMBA-Microsoft 
settlement, the only positive outcome of the Commission’s 
decision.  However, the General Court annulled this part of 
the decision.  The crafting of remedies needs to involve the 
consideration of an adequate institutional mechanism for 
their enforcement. 
The design of the tying part remedy was also particularly 
problematic, as the Commission took a quasi-regulatory role 
by imposing upon Microsoft a particular product design 
which, however, produced very poor results in the 
marketplace.  We will, however, argue that a structural 
remedy would not have been appropriate in this case.  We 
will then examine some possible alternative remedies before 
addressing the important issue of the proportionality of the 
remedies. 
A. The Enforcement Difficulties of the Interoperability 
Remedy: Institutional Aspects 
The appointment of a Monitoring Trustee, independent 
from Microsoft but on its payroll, was the primary 
mechanism of enforcement for the remedy imposed by the 
Commission for both the interoperability and tying parts.100  
The Monitoring Trustee was required to assess whether the 
information made available by Microsoft was complete and 
accurate and to ensure that Windows-N was not worse 
performing than any bundled version of Windows Microsoft 
 
ability to reject a complaint when it considers that a case lacks priority for 
other reasons (e.g., lack of Community interest). 
100 E.U. Microsoft I, supra note 2, ¶ 1044–45. 
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would continue to provide on the market.101  Furthermore, 
Article 4 of the European Commission’s decision imposed on 
Microsoft an obligation to refrain from repeating any act or 
practice which would have the same or equivalent object or 
effect as the anticompetitive conduct.  This exemplified the 
forward-looking role of the Monitoring Trustee, as it was 
clear that “the obligation to disclose interoperability 
information must apply ‘in a prospective manner’ to future 
generations of Microsoft’s products.”102  Microsoft successfully 
challenged this part of the decision at the General Court for 
lack of legal basis.103 
The General Court found that Regulation 17/62, in force 
at the time of the decision, did not provide the Commission 
with “the authority to compel Microsoft to grant to an 
independent monitoring trustee powers which the 
Commission itself was not authorized to confer on a third 
party.”104  The Court questioned the independence that the 
Monitoring Trustee would have had from both the 
Commission and Microsoft and the broad scope of his powers 
and mission.105  It also noted that no limit in time was 
envisaged for his continuing intervention in monitoring 
Microsoft’s compliance.  Moreover, the Court found that the 
costs associated with the enforcement of the remedy and 
compliance should not be borne by Microsoft but by the 
Commission in the course of fulfilling its own investigation 
and enforcement responsibilities.106 
The conservatism showed by the Court in envisioning an 
effective compliance mechanism seems misplaced.  The 
independence of the Monitoring Trustee from Microsoft  and 
the Commission ensured its impartiality, which was an 
essential characteristic in order to enhance compliance and 
cooperation from Microsoft.  This cooperation was crucial for 
 
101 Id. ¶ 1046. 
102 Case T-210/04, Microsoft Corp. v. Commission, 2007 E.C.R. II-3601, 
¶ 1270. 
103 Id. ¶ 1278. 
104 Id. ¶¶ 1271, 1278. 
105 Id. ¶ 1269. 
106 Id. ¶ 1277. 
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the success of the remedy and the provision of adequate 
information on the specifications for protocols implemented 
in Windows work group server operating systems.  After all, 
it is because the Monitoring Trustee had developed a relation 
of confidence with Microsoft’s technical staff that he had 
been able to mediate successfully between Microsoft and 
SAMBA.  Ironically, this success came during the period 
following the Court’s decision and before the Commission 
formally replaced him with a system of ad hoc external 
experts.107  It may not have been possible to achieve the same 
degree of cooperation from Microsoft had the Commission 
employed internal or external experts for the enforcement of 
the decision, because no direct relationship would have 
existed between Microsoft’s technical staff and the technical 
staff of the parties requiring interoperability.  It is true that 
the Commission’s decision should have included a realistic 
time horizon for the monitoring of the decision and should 
have quantified the costs.  However, as became clear in the 
compliance procedure for the United States antitrust 
decision, the extent and time-horizon of monitoring was 
unknown and depended on (1) the government clearly 
articulating its goals and (2) Microsoft’s willingness and 
ability to provide detailed specifications for its 
interoperability information.108  Sharing the costs of the 
enforcement mechanism would have limited the exorbitant, 
seemingly disproportionate costs for Microsoft, but at the 
same time it would have slightly reduced Microsoft’s 
incentives to comply with the decision.  The Commission 
could have nevertheless taken on a larger proportion of the 
expenses during the initial stages of the operation of the 
enforcement mechanism, with Microsoft’s share 
progressively increasing over time so that they bore the costs 
of delayed compliance. 
The appointment of the Monitoring Trustee illustrates 
the blurring of the distinction between competition law and 
 
107 Page & Childers, supra note 48, at 346. 
108 Id. at 75 (noting that “we have no way of estimating the costs of a 
program of this scale with any accuracy, but they certainly run into eight 
figures”). 
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regulation when it comes to the enforcement of far-reaching 
and forward-looking remedies, with regard to both the scope 
of the obligations imposed and the time-horizon of the 
remedy.  The European Monitoring Trustee intervened three 
years after the Technical Committee in the United States 
antitrust case started to monitor Microsoft’s compliance.  
The United States Technical Committee had become, at that 
time, a quasi-regulatory entity employing forty experts, and 
it had the ability to persuade the Department of Justice and 
the state Attorneys General that had sued Microsoft that 
additional obligations and burdens should be imposed to 
ensure effective interoperability.  The Technical Committee 
could receive complaints, interview Microsoft’s staff, and 
examine the Windows source code, subject to confidentiality.  
The expenses and salaries of the Committee were assumed 
by Microsoft.109  The Monitoring Trustee was able to build on 
these efforts to ensure interoperability and to benefit from 
the United States’ experience.  He also contributed to the 
compliance effort in the United States.  Indeed, in 2006, the 
United States Technical Committee started working closely 
with Microsoft’s experts to improve the technical 
documentation provided to licensees, using “as a starting 
point the specification agreed upon between Microsoft and 
the European Commission’s Monitoring Trustee.”110 
One could envision a higher degree of cooperation at the 
remedial stage of multijurisdictional cases such as Microsoft 
if compliance is ensured by an independent entity, like a 
Monitoring Trustee or a Technical Committee, and costs of 
the compliance mechanism are shared between jurisdictions.  
It is clear that despite the different theories of antitrust 
liability in Europe and in the United States, in the end, the 
remedies imposed with regard to the interoperability part of 
the decision converged.  This type of international 
cooperation at the remedial stage of antitrust cases could be 
 
109 State of New York v. Microsoft Corp., 224 F. Supp. 2d 76, 273–74 
(D.D.C. 2002). 
110 Joint Status Report on Microsoft’s Compliance with the Final 
Judgments, United States v. Microsoft Corp., 2006 WL 5154418 (D.D.C. 
Aug. 30. 2006) (Civ. Nos. 98-1232, 98-1233). 
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enhanced if the Commission had the ability to appoint 
independent compliance officers/experts.  The procedure has 
been used in the context of Article 9 of Regulation 1/2003 
commitment decisions, such as the Deutsche Bundesliga111 
and FA Premier League112 cases concerning the collective 
selling of media rights to football matches, where the 
Commission appointed a monitoring trustee to monitor the 
auctions of the Premier League rights, or in Repsol,113 where 
the Monitoring Trustee monitored the opening up of the fuel 
distribution system in Spain.  Monitoring Trustees were also 
used in merger cases cleared with obligations and 
commitments.  In those cases the Trustees may enjoy 
significant powers, such as the supervision and management 
of the divested business, the exercise of shareholder rights or 
the appointment of board members.114  The General Court’s 
decision in Microsoft raises questions on the legality of this 
practice, particularly since the company giving the 
commitment is usually required to incur the Trustee’s costs.  
Regulation 1/2003 does not grant the Commission any power 
to establish such monitoring mechanisms.  This is an issue 
that has not been tackled in the latest European 
Commission’s Report on the functioning of Regulation 
1/2003.115 
 
111 Case COMP/C-2/37.214 German Bundesliga, Commission Decision 
of 19 Jan. 2005 (summary at 2005 O.J. (L 134) 46). 
112 Commission Notice Published Pursuant to Article 19(3) of Council 
Regulation No. 17 Concerning Case COMP/C.2/38.173 and 38.453-Joint 
Selling of the Media Rights of the FA Premier League on an Exclusive 
Basis, 2004 O.J. (C 115) 3. 
113 Case COMP/B-1/38.348 Repsol CPP, Commission Decision of 12 
Apr. 2006 (summary at 2006 O.J. (L 176) 104). 
114 See, e.g., Case COMP/M.5406 IPIC/Man Ferrostaal AG, 
Commission Decision of 19 May 2009 (summary at 2009 O.J. (C 114) 08); 
Case COMP/M.5253 Sanofi-Aventis/Zentiva, Commission Decision  of 20 
Mar. 2009 (summary at 2009 O.J. (C 66) 24); Case COMP/M.5224 
EDF/British Energy, Commission Decision of 11 Nov. 2008 (summary at 
2008 O.J. (C 288) 10); Commission Notice on Remedies Acceptable under 
Council Regulation 139/2004 and under Regulation 802/2004, 2008 O.J. (C 
267) 1. 
115 Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament 
and the Council, Report on the Functioning of Regulation 1/2003, COM 
02-ECONOMIDES & LIANOS.DOC 5/11/2010  11:53:47 AM 
382 COLUMBIA BUSINESS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 2010 
B. The “Failure” of the Windows-N Remedy and the 
New Choicescreen Remedy 
As discussed previously, the E.U. decision, which was 
upheld by the Court of First Instance, found Microsoft liable 
for tying Windows Media Player with Windows.116  Windows 
Media Player participates in a market where it and its 
substitute media players are distributed without charge.  
Since there are always costs associated with developing 
software, both Microsoft and its competitors sell their media 
players below production and distribution cost.  Of course, as 
part of Windows, Windows Media Player is subsidized by 
part of the Windows revenue. 
Companies such as Microsoft and its competitors (for 
example RealAudio) distribute their media players for free 
with the hope that their software development costs will be 
recouped if (1) in the future the product will be sold at a 
positive price, (2) the firm will be able to sell upgraded 
versions of the software (with more features) at a positive 
price, or (3) the firm will be able to sell products or services 
complementary to the free product (for example, sell music 
or video downloads at a positive price or sell software that 
produces audio or video in a compatible format).  Although 
media players have been distributed for free for almost a 
decade and have experienced significant technological 
advances, there is no evidence that their basic versions will 
ever be sold at a positive price. Additionally, with the 
exception of Apple’s iTunes, there is no evidence of 
substantial revenues from sales of complementary 
products.117  Additionally, iTunes profits come almost 
exclusively from sales of the complementary hardware 
 
(2009) 206 final (Apr. 29, 2009), available at http://eur-lex.europa.eu/ 
LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:52009DC0206:EN:NOT. 
116 See supra Part III.A.2. 
117 Of course, there are attempts to get revenue from complementary 
goods. For example, Real Networks charges for an upgraded version of its 
media player and offers content through subscription services.  However, 
these revenues are not substantial and have led to the decline of 
companies that are essentially only in the software media player business 
such as Real Networks. 
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(iPods).118  Thus, restriction of competition in the media 
player universe can cause no damages arising from higher 
prices, since no company ever charges a positive price.  The 
only possible damages can arise from a restriction of the full 
extent of varieties and qualities of media players that might 
be available in the absence of the tying behavior of Microsoft. 
The variety issue is further complicated by the fact that a 
number of companies distribute media players that have a 
“favored” format but can also play content in a number of 
other formats, to the extent that the other format owners 
allow it.  So, for example, Windows Media Player plays WMA 
(the Microsoft-favored format) as well as MP3 (based on a 
public standard) but does not play the RealAudio format 
because the RealAudio specifications have not been made 
public.  Similarly, RealAudio plays its proprietary format, as 
well as WMA, MP3, and others.  Thus, wide distribution of 
Windows Media Player does not necessarily imply 
dominance of the WMA format since Windows Media Player 
can play many formats. 
It is possible, however, that even when content providers 
engage in dual encoding (encoding in a number of different 
formats), Microsoft may still benefit from its distributional 
advantage.  Ian Ayres and Barry Nalebuff noted that 
“Microsoft would still have the unique ability to ensure that 
its media player would be on all new machines—and thus 
eventually on all machines” and that “in turn, would mean 
that a content provider that encoded its content in the 
Windows Media Player format would be ensured nearly 
100% reach in the market” and would have therefore little 
incentive to engage in dual encoding.119  The conclusion that 
Windows Media Player will be eventually on all PCs is true 
only under restrictive modeling assumptions, and empirical 
 
118 See, e.g., Liam Cassidy, More on Apple’s Billions: This Time, 
It’s iTunes, THEAPPLEBLOG, Feb. 25, 2010, http://theappleblog.com/2010/02 
/25/more-on-apples-billions-this-time-its-itunes/. 
119 See Ian Ayres & Barry Nalebuff, Going Soft on Microsoft? The EU’s 
Antitrust Case and Remedy,  2 ECONOMISTS’ VOICE 1, 5 (2005), http://www. 
bepress.com/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1045&context=ev. 
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evidence attests that it is certainly not true today.120  
Additionally, the fact that Windows Media Player plays a 
number of other formats, including some based on open 
standards, makes the exclusivity argument of including 
Windows Media Player with Windows weak. 
In the aftermath of the United States v. Microsoft 
Corporation settlement,121 any consumer as well as any 
computer manufacturer can set up any media player as the 
default one, thereby severely limiting any distributional 
advantage of the joint distribution of Windows Media Player 
with Windows.  However, consumers and computer 
manufacturers do not benefit from the same distributional 
opportunities than Windows Media Player, precisely because 
dual encoding may not be materially equivalent to 
ubiquitous encoding. 
Finally, the distribution advantage that any player enjoys 
arguably is limited because any rival media player can be 
downloaded and installed in a few minutes.  If consumers do 
not think it is worth spending a couple of minutes to 
download and install rival players, clearly consumers do not 
see significant value in the variety and quality that rival 
players may add.  Thus, the damages that can be ascertained 
from Microsoft’s distributional advantage cannot be 
substantial.  The Commission and the Court may have 
overestimated the distributional advantage conferred to 
Windows Media Player by its joint distribution with 
Windows. 
 
120 See WebsiteOptimization.com, iTunes Player Hits a High Note, 
Passes RealPlayer, http://www.websiteoptimization.com/bw/0801/ (last 
visited Apr. 8, 2010). 
121 United States v. Microsoft Corp., 215 F. Supp. 2d 1 (D.D.C. 2002) 
(finding that the Tunney Act requiring judicial determination of whether 
the consent decree was in the public interest was applicable); United 
States v. Microsoft Corp., 231 F. Supp 2d. 144 (D.D.C. 2002) (considering 
that the decree’s remedy provisions were in the public interest); State of 
New York  v. Microsoft Corp., 224 F.Supp.2d 76 (D.D.C. 2002) (finding 
that the remedy imposed by the consent decree was appropriate for the 
non-settled states remedy proposal); aff’d sub nom. Massachusetts v. 
Microsoft Corp., 373 F.3d 1199 (D.C. Cir. 2004). 
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As a remedy, the Commission forced Microsoft to produce 
and distribute in the E.U. a version of Windows without 
Windows Media Player, which became known as Windows-
N.122  The Commission allowed Microsoft to continue 
producing and distributing the U.S. version of Windows that 
included Windows Media Player (but was subject to the 
requirements of the consent decree that resolved United 
States v. Microsoft Corporation) in the E.U.123  The E.U. did 
not mandate a specific price difference between Windows 
and Windows-N.124  The two versions of Windows were sold 
in the E.U. at the same price and practically no OEM bought 
and adopted Windows-N.125  Thus, the remedy imposed by 
the Commission had no noticeable effect in the marketplace.  
At the same time, the dire predictions of expanded 
dominance of WMA never materialized in the long period 
between the beginning of the E.U. case and the 
Commission’s decision or even later.  In contrast, a new, 
until recently proprietary, format promoted by Apple (tied to 
 
122 See E.U. Microsoft I, supra note 2, ¶ 1010 (“Under this Decision, 
Microsoft will have to offer a version of Windows for client PCs which does 
not include Windows Media Player.”). 
123 Id. ¶ 1021. 
124 The lack of a price difference requirement is in sharp contrast with 
the proposal to the District Court by the nine states (“litigating states”) 
that did not agree with the Department of Justice–Microsoft settlement 
that was also signed by nine other states.  The litigating states proposed to 
“freeze Windows” to its pre-1998 state and impose on Microsoft the 
requirement to sell any additional functionality at an additional price.  It 
is interesting, however, that the General Court noted in its decision that 
“[s]hould Microsoft now decide to sell the unbundled version of Windows at 
the same price as the bundled version, the Commission would examine 
that price by reference to the present market situation and in the light of 
Microsoft’s obligations to refrain from any measure having an equivalent 
effect to tying and, if necessary, adopt a new decision pursuant to Art. 82 
EC.”  Case T-201/04, Microsoft Corp. v. Commission, 2007 E.C.R. II-3601, 
¶ 908. 
125 Windows-N sold less than 2000 copies.  See Press Release, 
Microsoft Corp., Microsoft Fact Sheet: Windows XP N Sales (Apr. 2006), 
http://www.microsoft.com/presspass/legal/european/04-24-06windowsxpns 
alesfs.mspx/ (“[O]nly 1,787 copies of Windows XP N have been sold to 
retailers and distributors in Europe.”). 
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hardware also produced by Apple) has become the dominant 
format in the market for song downloads, a key market for 
goods that are complementary to media players.  
Additionally, “Flash player,” a new player from Adobe, has 
become the standard video player in Internet browsers. 
We are at a loss to understand why the E.U. Commission 
thought that requiring Microsoft to produce and distribute 
Windows without Windows Media Player was going to 
significantly increase competition in media players.  It was 
almost mathematically certain that Windows-N (without 
Windows Media Player), sold at the same price as Windows 
(with Windows Media Player), would not sell well, and 
therefore would have little impact on the market share of 
Windows Media Player.  It is also hard to imagine how 
depriving consumers of Windows Media Player in Windows-
N in the post-United States-settlement environment, where 
both the OEM and the final consumer could designate any 
media player as the default one, would have enhanced 
consumers’ choice.  The European Commission rather 
considered that consumers expected a media player but 
advanced that the OEMs should be free to build PCs that 
feature a non-Microsoft media player.126 
In negotiations before the Commission’s decision was 
announced, the Commission rejected a reported Microsoft 
proposed remedy to include three rival media players besides 
Windows Media Player with Windows and to let the 
consumer designate the default player.127  This proposal  
would have guaranteed as wide a distribution of RealAudio 
and other players as Windows Media Player, would have 
erased any distributional advantage of Windows Media 
Player, would have dispelled any tying concerns, and would 
have given full decision power to consumers. Such a remedy 
would have addressed the competition law concerns raised 
by Microsoft’s abuse much more effectively than the 
 
126 E.U. Microsoft I, supra note 2, ¶ 1025. 
127 See Tobias Buck, When Microsoft and Brussels Went Separate 
Ways, FIN. TIMES, Apr. 21, 2006, at 13, available at http://www.ft.com/cms/ 
s/2/51bd683e-d098-11da-b160-0000779e2340.html. 
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proposed remedy.128  At the same time, its adoption would 
have at least guaranteed the ability of even a dominant firm 
(Microsoft) in the complementary good (Windows) to 
innovate and distribute in the way it finds most appropriate.  
The benefits of this proposal both for consumers and 
innovation are obvious and substantial in comparison to the 
imposed remedy.  It provides consumers the best of both 
worlds—the benefits of standalone media players and the 
benefits of an integrated solution. 
We argue that the requirement that a dominant firm 
“must carry” the competitors products should, however, only 
be imposed when (1) there are substantial distributional 
advantages of the dominant firm in the sense that access to 
the dominant firm’s input is indispensable in order to viably 
stay on the market, and (2) there are substantial consumer 
losses arising from the lack of distribution through the 
dominant firm.  Because of the United States v. Microsoft 
Corporation settlement, computer manufacturers can install 
any media player they want without facing any penalties or 
retaliation from Microsoft.  To the extent that computer 
manufacturers install what consumers desire, the present 
extent of distribution of Windows Media Player with 
Windows seems more than a reflection of consumers’ choice 
than a decision by Microsoft.  Of course consumers are likely 
to be better off if they receive more free software delivered 
with their new computer, thus avoiding search costs and 
reducing the risk of the status quo bias advantages that 
benefit software that is already downloaded on the 
 
128 Indeed, the issue in this case was “not that Microsoft integrates 
[WMP] in Windows, but that it offers on the market only a version of 
Windows in which [WMP] is integrated, that is to say, that it does not 
allow OEMs or consumers to obtain Windows without [WMP] or, at least, 
to remove [WMP] from the system consisting of Windows and [WMP].”  
Case T-201/04, Microsoft Corp. v. Commission, 2007 E.C.R. II-3601, ¶ 
1149.  The remedy could have identified a number of media players from 
those existing at the time of the commitment of the abuse that would have 
been integrated to Windows.  It is in this respect different from a common 
carrier obligation, as it would not necessarily have extended to media 
players that would have been commercialized after the termination of the 
abuse. 
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desktop.129  This, however, does not mean that the dominant 
firm should have the obligation to distribute this software, 
and additionally to do so without collecting practically any 
revenue from competitors whose software it is forced to 
distribute, unless the operating system is considered as an 
essential facility.130  But in this case the standards of liability 
are different (allegedly stricter) than those required for 
 
129 William Samuelson & Richard J. Zeckhauser, Status Quo Bias in 
Decision Making, 1 J. RISK & UNCERTAINTY  7, 7 (1988); see also Amos 
Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, The Framing of Decisions and the 
Psychology of Choice, 211 SCI. 453 (1981) (discussing the dependence of 
preferences on the formulation of decision problems and the way choices 
are framed). 
130 The European Commission has defined an essential facility as “a 
facility or infrastructure without access to which competitors cannot 
provide services to their customers.”  See Case IV/34.174, B&I Line PLC v. 
Sealink Harbours Ltd., 5 C.M.L.R. 255, ¶ 41 (1992) (stating that the 
European Commission has defined an essential facility as “a facility or 
infrastructure without access to which competitors cannot provide services 
to their customers”).  Advocate General Francis Jacobs noted in his 
opinion in Case C-7/97, Oscar Bronner GmbH & Co. KG v. Mediaprint, 
1998 E.C.R. I-7791, ¶ 61, that “refusal of access may in some cases entail 
elimination or substantial reduction of competition to the detriment of 
consumers in both the short and long term” and “[t]hat will be so where 
access to a facility is a precondition for competition on a related market for 
goods or services for which there is a limited degree of interchangeability.”  
See  Alexandros Stratakis, Comparative Analysis of the US and EU 
Approach and Enforcement of the Essential Facilities Doctrine, 27 EUR. 
COMPETITION L. REV. 434  (2006) (comparing the scope of the essential 
facilities doctrine in Europe and in US antitrust law); John Temple Lang, 
Defining Legitimate Competition: Companies’ Duty to Supply Competitors 
and Access to Essential Facilities, 18 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 439, 446  (1994) 
(stating that the essential facilities doctrine has been merged with the 
general category of cases involving refusal to supply); see also 
Communication from the Commission: Guidance on the Commission’s 
Enforcement Priorities in Applying Article 82 EC to Abusive Exclusionary 
Conduct by Dominant Undertakings,  2009 O.J. (C45) 7, ¶ 78 (noting that 
the concept of refusal to supply covers a broad range of practices, such as a 
refusal to supply products to existing or new customers, refusal to license 
intellectual property rights, including when the licence is necessary to 
provide interface information, or refusal to grant access to an essential 
facility or a network). 
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tying.131  It seems to us that, if the competition authority 
decides to impose a “must carry” remedy, it should bring a 
proper essential facilities case rather than rely on the most 
favorable, for carrying its standard of proof, liability 
standards of tying and then ask for a “must carry” remedy. 
The “must carry” obligation is of special interest because 
it has been considered by the E.U. as a possible remedy in its 
current investigation of Microsoft for bundling Internet 
Explorer with Windows, as discussed in detail below.132  
Clearly, the E.U. could not require that Windows be 
distributed without an Internet browser and the ability to 
download a browser because that would severely cripple the 
ability of the typical user to reach the Internet.  But does it 
make sense for Microsoft to be required to distribute rival 
browsers? 
It may be that requiring Microsoft to distribute rival 
browsers may not provide an appropriate remedy, in the 
presence of weak anticipative effects.  Like with media 
 
131 The European Court of Justice took a restrictive view of the 
obligation of a dominant undertaking to grant access to its facilities by 
imposing a number of conditions in Case C-7/97, Oscar Bronner GmbH & 
Co. KG v. Mediaprint, 1998 E.C.R. I-7791, ¶¶ 41, 45–46.  The refusal 
“must be likely to eliminate all competition” on the part of the competitor 
requesting access, that access should be indispensable and not only make 
it harder for the requesting undertaking to compete and it should not be 
capable of being objectively justified.  With regard to the indispensability 
condition, the Court held that access would have been indispensable only 
if it was not economically viable to create a home-delivery system for a 
newspaper with a comparable circulation to the dominant firm’s.  The 
conditions in Bronner set the outer boundaries of the special responsibility 
of a dominant firm and consequently of the corresponding duty, under 
Article 102, to abstain from any action that would be likely to exclude 
rivals from the market.   The excluded rival would be granted access only 
if it is impossible for an undertaking with a comparable output to the 
dominant firm to develop such facility, which indicates that the Court 
applies a not yet as efficient as test.  For a comparison with tying 
standards, see Economides & Lianos, supra note 8, at 539–40. 
132 Press Release, Eur. Comm’n, Antitrust: Commission Initiates 
Formal Investigations Against Microsoft in Two Cases of Suspected Abuse 
of Dominant Market Position (Jan. 14, 2008),   available at http://europa. 
eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=MEMO/08/19 (awaiting the 
publication of the final decision of the Commission). 
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players, competing browsers can be downloaded and 
installed in a few minutes, so the reluctance of consumers to 
do so might show that they do not find any competing 
browser to be sufficiently desirable.  But consumers’ 
unwillingness to download other browsers may reflect a 
status quo bias favoring Internet Explorer, particularly 
because, having used only Internet Explorer, the user has no 
real way to know what it means for a browser to be better.133  
There may also be a natural reluctance to take on additional 
learning costs associated with using a different browser.  
OEMs may also refrain from the additional support costs 
that are associated with offering another browser. 
Nevertheless, the damage that consumers may incur from 
the joint distribution of Internet Explorer with Windows is 
very limited. In the particular case of the browser, as 
contrasted with the media players, there is almost full 
compatibility between the various browsers.134  Additionally, 
Firefox provides a plug-in that emulates Internet Explorer 
and can even be used for live updates from Microsoft that 
require Internet Explorer.135  As with the media player 
analysis, there are no damages because of price competition 
since all the browsers are distributed for free.  Additionally, 
the almost full compatibility of browsers implies that the 
benefits of variety and quality will be smaller than in the 
 
133 See  Samuelson &  Zeckhauser, supra note 129, at 7 (discussing 
how behavioral law and economics have emphasized the consideration of 
status quo bias in envisioning consumer behavior).  On the importance of 
heuristics and biases in analyzing behavior, see generally JUDGMENT 
UNDER UNCERTAINTY: HEURISTICS AND BIASES (Kahneman et al. eds.,  
1982). 
134 Compatibility is ensured by the adherence to common and open 
standards published by W3C.  See W3C, Web Design and Applications, 
http://www.w3.org/standards/webdesign/ (last visited Apr. 8, 2010).  Of 
course, these are evolving standards and one browser may implement a 
new web page rendering standard while another may not.  So there may 
be differences in appearance depending on implementation, especially if 
the source code of a page is written in the newest standard. 
135 See Mozilla, Firefox Add-ons, https://addons.mozilla.org/en-US/ 
firefox/addon/35  (last visited Apr. 6, 2010). 
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media player market.  Thus, it seems likely that imposition 
of the “must carry” remedy is out of proportion in this case. 
Where the effects on consumers are more substantial, the 
“must carry” remedy might be an appropriate remedy, 
although it could face some practical difficulties.  For 
example, in the U.S. Microsoft case, the court considered 
requiring Microsoft to distribute Java.136  However, the court 
found that a “must carry” requirement would not provide a 
substantial benefit to competition once Microsoft’s 
anticompetitive restraints on other channels of Java 
distribution were lifted by the other parts of the court’s 
remedy (exclusivity arrangements).137  However, the primary 
reason for the court’s reluctance was its uneasiness in 
granting a specific competitor, Sun Microsystems, an 
advantage in its efforts to compete with Microsoft that was 
not accorded to other competitors in the industry.  The court 
noted that “favoritism of one market participant over 
another in a remedy provision places the court in the 
improper position of exerting too much control over the 
market.”138  An adequate remedy would have to provide equal 
treatment to third parties in order to restore competition.  
For example, complainants should not be the only ones 
receiving the benefits of a “must carry” obligation: any firm 
that is capable of challenging the dominant firm should be 
included in the design of this obligation.  It follows that for 
the “must carry” obligation to function equitably, new 
products should also be periodically included.  This could 
raise some practical difficulties, such as which browsers to 
include and on what license terms, when there are five main 
browsers and several others from niche players.  Also, the 
release schedule of these browsers must be aligned with the 
release schedule of Windows through further negotiation 
between the parties. 
Negotiations between the Commission and Microsoft on 
whether to implement a version of a “must carry” rule gave 
 
136 State of New York v. Microsoft Corp., 224 F. Supp. 2d 76, 188–90 
(D.D.C. 2002). 
137 Id. at 189. 
138 Id. 
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rise to important recent developments.  As previously 
explained, the Commission opened formal proceedings on 
Opera’s complaint in December 2007 and issued a Statement 
of Objections to Microsoft in January 2009.139  To terminate 
the Commission’s current investigation in the Internet 
Explorer case, Microsoft initially announced that it would 
not distribute the standard Windows 7 in Europe.140   
Instead, it intended to produce and distribute in Europe 
solely a special edition of Windows 7 called Windows 7 E 
which would not have Internet Explorer or any other 
browser pre-installed, adopting the removal approach of the 
Windows XP N remedy imposed by the Commission in the 
Windows Media Player case, as the sole version of Windows 
in Europe.  OEMs would have the option to install a web 
browser of their choice as the default as well as include other 
browsers before the PC reached the final consumers.141 
As part of Microsoft’s initial proposal, European 
consumers who bought an upgrade to Windows 7 for 
Windows Vista or XP, or bought Windows 7 to install from 
scratch on a “naked” computer (which comes from the 
manufacturer without an operating system) would be given a 
version of Windows 7 E that would include a file transfer 
protocol (FTP) link to a website from which they could 
download and install Internet Explorer 8.  The Commission 
applauded Microsoft’s steps to provide OEMs more 
 
139 See Press Release, Eur. Comm’n, Competition: Statement of 
Objections to Microsoft for Non-Compliance with March 2004 Decision— 
Frequently Asked Questions (Mar. 1, 2007), http://europa.eu/rapid/press 
ReleasesAction.do?reference=MEMO/07/90&format=HTML&aged=0&lang
uage=EN&guiLanguage=en; Microsoft Corp., Annual Report (Form 10-K), 
at 68–70 (July 30, 2009). 
140 Matthew Newman, Microsoft Is Said to Be in Talks to Settle EU 
Cases, BLOOMBERG, July 7, 2009, http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news? 
pid=newsarchive&sid=abzAzMCoi3Rw. 
141 Press Release, Eur. Comm’n, Antitrust: Commission Statement on 
Microsoft Internet Explorer Announcement (Jan. 12 2009), http://europa. 
eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=MEMO/09/272&format=HTML
&aged=0&language=EN&guiLanguage=en. 
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flexibility, but was critical of Microsoft’s decision on the 
distribution of the retail upgrade or retail clean install.142 
Based on that public feedback, as well as on private 
discussions, Microsoft withdrew its unilateral plan of 
distributing Windows 7 E143 and proposed a final resolution 
in which it committed144 to (i) distribute a “ballot screen” 
(actually a “choices screen”) through software update145 to 
European users of Windows XP, Windows Vista, Windows 7, 
and Windows client PC operating systems and (ii) allow both 
OEMs and users to turn on or off Internet Explorer.146  Thus, 
Microsoft’s proposed remedy was not limited to Windows 7.  
The European Commission received comments from third 
parties and finally accepted Microsoft’s commitments by 
adopting an Article 9 Regulation 1/2003 decision on 16 
December 2009.147 
This remedy may have far-reaching consequences on the 
structure of the web browser industry and the distributional 
advantage of Internet Explorer.  The choice screen will give 
those users who have set Internet Explorer as their default 
web browser an opportunity to choose whether and which 
competing web browser (or browsers) to install in addition to 
the one they already have.148  Users will be able to select one 
 
142 Id. 
143 Dave Heiner, Microsoft on the Issues, Windows 7 and Browser 
Choice in Europe, http://microsoftontheissues.com/cs/blogs/mscorp/archive/ 
2009/07/31/windows-7-and-browser-choice-in-europe.aspx (last visited Apr. 
8, 2010). 
144 Press Release, Microsoft Corp., Proposed Commitment (July 24, 
2009), available at http://www.microsoft.com/presspass/presskits/eu-msft/ 
docs/07-24-09Commitment.doc [hereinafter Commitment]. 
145 The words “ballot screen” were used inappropriately in the 
preliminary design of the remedy; the appropriate words are “choices 
screen.”  There is no ballot here and there is no decision by majority or any 
other rule that will be imposed on all participants.  The screen will allow 
each consumer to set the default browser of their choice and allow the 
consumer to uninstall Internet Explorer. 
146 See Microsoft Corp., Proposal Document Annex A (July 24, 2000), 
http://www.microsoft.com/presspass/presskits/eu-msft/docs/ANNEX_A.doc 
(detailing how this will be implemented in Windows 7). 
147 E.U. Microsoft II, supra note 7. 
148 Commitment, supra note 144,  ¶ 8. 
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or more of the web browsers offered through the choices 
screen.  Microsoft has committed to distribute and install the 
choice screen software update “in a manner that is designed 
to bring about installation of this update at a rate that is as 
least as high as that for the most recent version of Internet 
Explorer offered via Windows Update.”149  The Commission’ 
decision also emphasized that: 
nothing in the design and implementation of the 
Choice Screen and the presentation of competing web 
browsers will express a bias for a Microsoft web 
browser or any other web browser or discourage the 
user from downloading and installing additional web 
browsers via the ChoiceScreen and making a web 
browser competing with a Microsoft web browser the 
default.150 
The design of the choice screen attempts to represent as 
best as possible actual consumer preferences.  At the same 
time, it avoids providing an excessively large choice that 
would have occupied a lot of disk space.  The choices screen 
will be populated with the twelve most widely used web 
browsers that run on Windows 7 as measured semi-annually 
by averaging monthly usage share data for the previous six 
months for which data is available, with only one browser 
per vendor listed and shares for different released versions of 
the same vendor’s browsers added together to determine the 
browser’s total usage share.151  That will not include Internet 
Explorer “or any other browser which is based on Internet 
Explorer’s rendering engine and the development or 
distribution of which is funded in whole or in substantial 
part by Microsoft.”152  The choices screen will display icons 
and the basic identifying information of the web browsers in 
a horizontal line and in an unbiased way.153  In addition, the 
choices screen will prominently display the final releases of 
 
149 Id. ¶ 9. 
150 Id. ¶ 10. 
151 Id. ¶¶ 11,14. 
152 Id. ¶ 14. 
153 Id. ¶ 13. 
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the five web browsers with the highest usage share in the 
EEA, the remaining seven being displayed in a random order 
if the user scrolls sideways.154  In order to ensure a higher 
degree of transparency, only those web browsers included in 
at last two of the three data sources for usage share 
information for web browsers (ComScore, NetApplications 
and StatCounter) would be considered for the choices screen.  
These will be ranked according to the arithmetic means of 
their numerical ranks in the data sources, taking into 
account their best ranking in two data sources.155  The 
Commission Decision also specified that “Microsoft will bear 
the costs of the technical implementation of the remedy in 
Windows and may not charge for the inclusion of a third 
party web browser in the Ballot Screen.”156 
The choice screen remedy is limited to web browsers and 
any web browser vendor eligible to appear on the choice 
screen should refrain from installing additional software in 
the same download.  Microsoft has to include the promotion 
of competing browsers, but does not have to distribute the 
code of third parties’ browsers.  The duration of the 
commitment is five years, leaving a wide window of 
opportunity to Microsoft’s rivals, and in particular Google, to 
take hold of a significant part of the web browser market. 
 
Microsoft will ensure that if Internet Explorer is 
turned off, then (i) it can only be turned on through 
user action specifically aimed at turning on Internet 
Explorer; (ii) the user interface cannot be called upon 
by applications; and (iii) no icons, links or shortcuts 
or any other means will appear within Windows to 
start a download or installation of Internet 
Explorer.157 
A website will provide all necessary information about 
turning on or off Internet Explorer.  In addition, Microsoft 
 
154 Id.  
155 Id. ¶ 14. 
156 Id.  
157 Id. ¶ 1. 
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“will maintain that [website] so that other browser vendors 
can link to it if they wish.”158  In essence, the “OEMs will be 
free to pre-install any web browser (or browsers) of their 
choice on PCs they ship and to set any browser as the default 
web browser.”159  Microsoft has also committed “not to 
retaliate against any OEM refraining from developing, 
using, distributing, promoting or supporting any software 
that competes with Microsoft web browsers” through an 
alteration of commercial relations with that OEM, or by 
withholding the application of preferential terms, or finally 
by entering into any agreement with an OEM that conditions 
the grant of any monetary payment, discount, or the 
provision of preferential licensing terms or any other 
preferential treatment on the choice of Internet Explorer.160 
In many ways, the European Commission’s proposed 
outcome is similar to that of the United States consent 
decree.  The United States consent decree allowed OEMs and 
final consumers to choose the default browser; similarly, 
OEMs and final consumers will choose the default browser in 
Europe. But there are also important differences.161 
First, the United States consent decree was broader since 
it applied to all middleware, while the proposed E.U. 
outcome covers only browsers.  Besides browsers, 
middleware includes email clients, audio-players, instant 
messengers, Java, and other software that functions between 
the operating system and applications. 
Second, unlike in the United States, where all final 
consumers are given the opportunity to choose a default 
browser (and other middleware) through a “set defaults” 
screen,162 Microsoft’s commitment in Europe will give a 
choice of browser to final consumers only if their computer 
 
158 Id. 
159 Id. ¶ 2. 
160 Id. ¶¶ 4–5. 
161 State of New York v. Microsoft Corp., 224 F. Supp. 2d 76, 273 
(D.D.C. 2002). 
162 Id. 
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has Internet Explorer set as the default browser.163  If the 
computer manufacturer has set up a browser other than 
Internet Explorer as the default, the final consumer will not 
be presented with the E.U. choice screen or the “set defaults” 
screen available to United States consumers.  Thus, the 
mechanism is tilted (1) against Microsoft, since computers 
with a non-Internet Explorer default will not offer consumers 
a choice of browsers like that offered with a computer loaded 
with Internet Explorer, and (2) in favor of non-Microsoft 
commercial browser vendors (Chrome, Opera, Safari, etc.) 
who can compensate OEMs to set up their browser as a 
default and then will not have their browser potentially 
removed via a choice screen.  This may favor non-Microsoft 
browser vendors that have the deepest pockets. 
Third, in the proposed E.U. outcome, Microsoft is 
obligated to line up many competitors’ browsers for the final 
consumer to choose from.  Thus, the Commission’s proposed 
outcome is a choice screen rule imposed on Microsoft, 
especially since it applies only to computers where the OEM 
has installed Internet Explorer as the default.  In the United 
States middleware default set-up screen, the consumer is 
faced with a list of browsers chosen by his computer’s 
manufacturer.164  Depending on the computer manufacturer’s 
choices, this list could be extensive, but could also be limited 
to a single browser (Internet Explorer or another one) and 
the consumer would need to take extra steps to download 
other choices. 
 
163 In the European Union, final users will be automatically prompted 
to choose a browser if their computer came with Internet Explorer as the 
default, while in the United States they are not automatically prompted 
but just have the option of choosing between defaults.  See Heiner, supra 
note 143 (“Shortly after new Windows PCs are set up by the user, 
Microsoft will update them over the Internet with a consumer ballot 
software program.  If Internet Explorer is the default browser, the user 
will be presented with a list of other leading browsers and invited to select 
one or more for installation.”).  No choices screen will appear to users if 
Internet Explorer is not the default browser. 
164 See State of New York v. Microsoft Corp., 224 F. Supp. 2d 76, 273 
(D.D.C. 2002). 
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Fourth, the proposed E.U. outcome allows OEMs and 
consumers to uninstall more layers of Internet Explorer, if 
they wish, than just the front end of Internet Explorer that 
the United States decree allows.  In the proposed E.U. 
outcome, an OEM may choose never to show the existence of 
Internet Explorer to the final customer.  Even so, deeper 
layers of the Internet Explorer API will remain in Windows 
when Internet Explorer is “off” and an applications 
manufacturer will be able to call and utilize the Internet 
Explorer API for both the “on” and “off” Internet Explorer 
functions.  Additionally, users can always ‘turn on’ Internet 
Explorer even if the OEM has turned it off. OEMs cannot 
permanently disable Internet Explorer.165 
Fifth, for an OEM that has chosen a default browser 
other than Internet Explorer in Europe, operating system 
and security updates will not appear to be carried out 
through Internet Explorer.  That is, even if Internet Explorer 
is used to update software in the background, the consumer 
will see an interface that does not mention Internet 
Explorer.166 
C. Would a Structural Remedy Have Been an 
Appropriate Solution to the Microsoft Antitrust 
Problem? 
In thinking about a potential structural remedy in the 
E.U. case, it is worth discussing how it was imposed in the 
United States case.  This is because in both cases, the main 
issue involved Microsoft leveraging monopoly power to a 
market of a complementary good. 
In United States v. Microsoft, Judge Jackson adopted the 
plaintiff’s remedies proposal word-for-word and imposed a 
breakup of Microsoft into two “Baby Bills,”167
 
an operating 
 
165 See Commitment, supra note 144, ¶ 7. 
166 This means that the Windows updates will be provided in the same 
way they are provided today in Vista and in Windows 7 Release 
Candidate. 
167 This is a word play on “Baby Bells” that came out of AT&T and the 
first name of the co-founder and then CEO of Microsoft, Bill Gates. 
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systems company which would inherit all the operating 
systems software, and an “applications” company with all the 
remaining software assets.  Cash and securities holdings of 
other companies held by Microsoft would have been split 
between the resulting entities.  Bill Gates and other officers 
of the company would not have been allowed to hold 
executive and ownership positions in both of the resulting 
companies.168 
In arguing for the break-up, the government put forward 
a number of reasons.169  But, since there was only an 
extremely short formal hearing on remedies, there was no 
chance for both the government’s and Microsoft’s cases on 
remedies to be discussed and evaluated.170  The government 
and the judge have stated (formally and informally) the 
following arguments for a breakup:171 
1. That they considered the repeated violations of 
antitrust law by Microsoft as an indication that 
Microsoft would not follow any conduct or contractual 
restrictions;172 in fact, in some informal remarks, 
government officials believe that they were “tricked” 
 
168 For a more detailed evaluation of the final United States remedy, 
see Nicholas Economides, Comment of Nicholas S. Economides on the 
Revised Proposed Final Judgment (Jan. 22, 2002), available at 
http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/cases/ms_tuncom/major/mtc-00022465.htm. 
169 See generally Plaintiffs’ Proposed Final Judgment, United States v. 
Microsoft, 215 F. Supp. 2d 1 (D.D.C. 2002) (Civ. Nos. 98-1232, 98-1233), 
available at http://www.justice.gov/atr/cases /f219100/219106.htm.  
170 The hearing on remedy was on May 24, 2000.  It started at 10:15 
am, ended around 3:30 pm, and included a two-hour lunch break.  See 
Open Law: The Microsoft Case, United States v. Microsoft: Trial 
Transcripts and Exhibits, http://cyber.law.harvard.edu/msdoj/trial.html 
(last visited Apr. 8, 2010). 
171 See Plaintiffs’ Proposed Final Judgment, supra note 169. 
172 United States v. Microsoft Corp., 97 F. Supp. 2d 59, 62 (D.D.C. 
2000) (“Second, there is credible evidence in the record to suggest that 
Microsoft, convinced of its innocence, continues to do business as it has in 
the past, and may yet do to other markets what it has already done in the 
PC operating system and browser markets.  Microsoft has shown no 
disposition to voluntarily alter its business protocol in any significant 
respect.”). 
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by Microsoft in settling the 1995 case with terms that 
Microsoft was able to exploit;173 
2. That the lack of remorse by Microsoft’s executives was 
a clear indication that Microsoft “could not be trusted” 
to implement any other remedy;174 
3. That the breakup was a “surgical cut” that would 
create the least interference with business;175 
4. That as AT&T and the rest of the telecommunications 
industry benefited from AT&T’s breakup, so Microsoft 
and the software industry were expected to similarly 
benefit since both industries have network effects; 
5. That the breakup would have eliminated the incentive 
for vertical foreclosure; and 
6. That the breakup would have reduced the 
“applications barrier to entry” since now the 
applications company might write popular Microsoft 
applications (such as MS-Office) for other platforms. 
The government failed to show that the proposed (and 
later abandoned) breakup was the appropriate remedy.  The 
Department of Justice did not perform the appropriate cost-
benefit analysis to show that conduct remedies were not 
sufficient and that a breakup is necessary.  None of the 
 
173 Id. (“Third, Microsoft has proved untrustworthy in the past.  In 
earlier proceedings in which a preliminary injunction was entered, 
Microsoft's purported compliance with that injunction while it was on 
appeal was illusory and its explanation disingenuous.”). 
174 Id. (“First: despite the Court's Findings of Fact and Conclusions of 
Law, Microsoft does not yet concede that any of its business practices 
violated the Sherman Act.  Microsoft officials have recently been quoted 
publicly to the effect that the company has ‘done nothing wrong’ and that 
it will be vindicated on appeal.  Indeed, it has announced its intention to 
appeal even the imposition of the modest conduct remedies it has itself 
proposed as an alternative to the non-structural remedies sought by the 
plaintiffs.”). 
175 See generally Decl. of Carl Shapiro, United States v. Microsoft 
Corp., 97 F. Supp. 2d 59 (Civ. Nos. 98-1232, 98-1233) (Apr. 28, 2000), 
available at http://www.justice.gov/atr/cases/f219100/219127.htm. 
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affidavits in the remedies phase even approached a 
discussion on evaluating alternatives.  Additionally, a few 
weeks before Judge Jackson’s decision, under the supervision 
of Judge Posner176 the government and Microsoft had 
reached a compromise that imposed only conduct remedies.177  
The government failed to justify why it was ready to 
compromise a few weeks earlier (in the settlement 
negotiated by Judge Richard Posner who was asked to try to 
find a settlement by Judge Jackson), on behavioral remedies 
but later claimed that structural remedies were necessary.  
Harry First notes that the plaintiffs would have been 
probably more successful “had they clearly such a remedy in 
mind at an earlier stage in the proceeding.”178 
The first argument of the government in support of a 
breakup does not stand to reason.  The 1995 case was settled 
with a decree that explicitly stated that Microsoft can 
include in its operating system any additional 
functionality.179  It is reasonable that Microsoft (or any 
observer, including the Department of Justice) would believe, 
given the 1995 consent decree, that adding browser 
functionality to Windows does not violate the consent 
decree.180  This, of course, does not mean that adding such 
functionality does not violate antitrust law in general, but it 
 
176 See Joe Wilcox, Major Setback in Microsoft Settlement Talks, CNET 
NEWS, Apr. 1, 2000, http://news.cnet.com/2100-1001-238717.html. 
177 The settlement was rejected by the States. See Julian Goldsmith, 
Nine States Reject Microsoft Settlement, SILICON, Nov. 7, 2001, http://www. 
silicon.com/technology/hardware/2001/11/07/nine-states-reject-microsoft-se 
ttlement-11028939/. 
178 First, supra note 87, at 32. 
179 See United States v. Microsoft, 59 Fed. Reg. 42, 845-02, 42, 855 
(1994) (“Microsoft shall not enter into any License Agreement in which the 
terms of that agreement are expressly or impliedly conditioned upon: 
(1) the licensing of any other Covered Product, Operating System Software 
product or other product (provided, however, that this provision in and of 
itself shall not be construed to prohibit Microsoft from developing 
integrated products).”) (emphasis added). 
180 The dispute regarding the application of the 1995 consent decree 
ended with a D.C. Circuit ruling in favor of Microsoft’s understanding of 
the meaning of the decree.  United States v. Microsoft Corp., 147 F.3d 935 
(D.C. Cir. 1998). 
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puts to its death the idea that the government was tricked by 
Microsoft.  The fact that companies and antitrust enforcers 
often have an asymmetry of information is very common and 
expected, and cannot be considered a trick, or a reason not to 
enter into agreements between antitrust authorities and 
companies. 
The second argument of the Department of Justice in 
support of the breakup seems excessive.  Antitrust 
enforcement is not an emotional tug of war in which the egos 
of either the plaintiffs or the defendants need to be satisfied.  
The show of remorse or lack thereof by Microsoft executives 
could not possibly define the remedy.  We find it hard to 
believe that the judge would be correct in finding a different 
remedy appropriate if enough Microsoft executives simply 
showed public remorse.  Moreover, Microsoft, like any other 
defendant, had a right to appeal (and it did so).  A 
defendant’s belief that he will prevail on appeal should not 
result in punishment. 
The third argument, that the breakup is a surgical cut 
and therefore would have disrupted the industry the least, is 
countered by the facts.  A breakup of Microsoft would have 
eliminated Microsoft as a flexible and formidable competitor.  
The wholehearted endorsement of the breakup by Microsoft’s 
competitors in servers and back office (who were not found in 
United States v. Microsoft to have incurred damages by the 
Windows monopoly but who would have greatly benefited 
from the confusion and disruption created by a Microsoft 
breakup) is evidence that the breakup would have been one 
of the most disruptive possible outcomes.181  Generally 
breakups of large companies are complicated and drawn-out 
affairs that disrupt the company that is broken up, the 
producers of complementary goods to its products, and its 
customers. 
 
181 See Wylie Wong, Oracle Chief Defends Microsoft Snooping, CNET 
NEWS, Jun. 28, 2000, http://news.cnet.com/Oracle-chief-defends-Microsoft-
snooping/2100-1001_3-242560.html; see also Dan Goodin & Dawn 
Kawamoto, Foes Take Microsoft to Task, CNET NEWS, Mar. 3, 1998, http:// 
news.cnet.com/Foes-take-Microsoft-to-task/2100-1023_3-208653.html?tag= 
mncol. 
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The fourth argument, that, since AT&T’s 1982 breakup 
was successful, Microsoft’s would also be successful, was also 
incorrect.  AT&T was divided into the long-distance company 
(AT&T), and seven regional operating companies, each of 
which remained a regulated local telecommunications 
monopoly until 1996.  The destruction of AT&T’s long-
distance monopoly encouraged competition, which brought 
sharply lower prices and immense consumer benefits.182
  
There are a number of key differences between the two 
companies and their competitive situations.  And these 
differences make it very likely that a Microsoft breakup, 
besides harming Microsoft, would have harmed consumers 
and the computer industry.183 
In 1981, AT&T was a 100-year-old regulated monopoly 
with many layers of management.  For historical reasons, 
the local phone companies within the old AT&T, such as New 
York Telephone, were managed separately from the “long 
lines” division.  Thus, it was not difficult to separate the 
divisions since they functioned on many levels as separate 
companies. AT&T also had an abundance of managers to 
help cope with the breakup.184  By contrast, Microsoft is a 
young, entrepreneurial company run by few top executives, 
and its divisions are fluid.  While this has made Microsoft an 
efficient and successful company, it also means that a break-
up would have posed significant managerial problems and 
severely reduced the company’s flexibility.  Finally, AT&T 
was a regulated utility, and regulation guaranteed that the 
companies emerging from the breakup stayed 
interconnected.185  In contrast, the Microsoft breakup would 
 
182 See Nicholas Economides, Telecommunications Regulation: An 
Introduction, in THE LIMITS AND COMPLEXITY OF ORGANIZATIONS 48, 55–57 
(Richard R. Nelson ed., 2005). 
183 See Economides, supra note 92, at 7–39. 
184 See generally ROBERT W. CRANDALL, CHANGING THE RULES: 
TECHNOLOGICAL CHANGE, INTERNATIONAL COMPETITION, AND REGULATION IN 
COMMUNICATIONS (1989); Nicholas Economides, The Telecommunications 
Act of 1996 and Its Impact, 11 JAPAN & WORLD ECON. 455 (1999). 
185 See CRANDALL, supra note 184; see also Roger G. Noll and Bruce M. 
Owen, United States v. AT&T: The Economic Issues, in THE ANTITRUST 
REVOLUTION 290, (J. Kwoka & L. White eds., 1989). 
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likely have lead to incompatibilities and further loss of 
efficiency.186 
The Department of Justice’s two-way breakup plan was 
premised on the hope that an autonomous applications 
company would create a new operating system to compete 
with Windows.  But at trial it was stipulated that more than 
70,000 applications187 run on Windows, creating what the 
government called “the applications barrier to entry” in the 
operating-system market.188  The new applications company, 
however capable, is unlikely to be able to single-handedly 
create a successful rival operating system in short order. 
The breakup of Microsoft, which, after the DC Court of 
Appeals decision, was not pursued by the government, would 
have had detrimental effects.  First, the breakup was likely 
to result in higher prices.  If the Department of Justice was 
correct and Microsoft kept its OS prices low so that it could 
exercise its monopoly power in the adjacent browser market, 
the post-breakup Baby Bill that would inherit the operating 
system would have had no incentive to keep the price low.  
The OS Baby Bill would no longer have the incentive to 
disadvantage any applications companies.  Thus, if the 
Department of Justice’s theories are correct, the OS Baby 
Bill would have exercised its monopoly power and raise the 
price of the operating system to the detriment of consumers.  
If the Department of Justice was correct and Microsoft has 
significant monopoly power because of the applications 
barrier to entry and network effects,189 higher prices would 
be the direct result of the breakup.  Second, as explained 
 
186 The companies that would emerge from a Microsoft breakup would 
all have the same intellectual property, so their products would be 
compatible.  However, each company would have a strong incentive to 
create incompatibilities to differentiate its offerings and be able to 
increase its price to cost and profit margins. 
187 Finding of Facts ¶ 40, United States v. Microsoft, Civ. No. 98-1233 
(1998),  available at http://www.justice.gov/atr/cases/f2600/2613-1.htm#III. 
188 Id. ¶¶ 36–49. 
189 See  Decl. of Franklin M. Fisher, United States v. Microsoft,  
available at http://www.justice.gov/atr/cases/f212700/212766.htm. 
02-ECONOMIDES & LIANOS.DOC 5/11/2010  11:53:47 AM 
No. 2:346] E.U. MICROSOFT REMEDIES 405 
above, the breakup would likely eliminate the efficiencies 
that make Microsoft a flexible and formidable competitor. 
A breakup would likely temporarily eliminate the 
incentive for interference between OSs and applications.  Of 
course, the same goal has been accomplished by conduct 
restrictions without the cost and the disruption of a breakup.  
Moreover, the district court’s breakup proposal did not 
impose permanent restrictions on the post-breakup functions 
of the resulting companies.  The two Baby Bills would have 
been able to enter into each other’s business soon after the 
breakup.  It is very likely that a few years after such a 
breakup, one of the resulting companies would dominate 
both markets. 
D. Alternative Remedies 
The difficulty of devising adequate remedies that address 
both the application entry barrier issue and the 
distributional advantage of Windows, combined with the 
alleged “failure” of the traditional conduct remedies 
employed in this case,190 led some commentators to suggest 
alternative and unconventional remedies, including non-
antitrust alternatives. 
1. Public Procurement Procedures as an Antitrust 
Remedy: Reducing the Applications Barrier 
Regulation is not the only mechanism by which states can 
intervene in the marketplace.  Increasingly, state ownership 
and/or state contracting/spending are employed in order to 
achieve specific public policy objectives, such as improving 
competition in the marketplace.191  Professor Herbert 
Hovenkamp suggested the possibility of using public 
contracting as a tool to reduce Microsoft’s applications 
barrier to entry.  He cited the example of Alcoa, where Alcoa 
was excluded from an auction for government-owned 
 
190 Carl Shapiro, Microsoft: A Remedial Failure, 75 ANTITRUST L.J. 739 
(2009). 
191 See CHRISTOPHER MCCRUDDEN, BUYING SOCIAL JUSTICE (2007). 
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aluminum plants in a sale conducted pursuant to the 
Surplus Property Act, which “required the government to 
consider the impact on competition whenever it sold a 
significant piece of private property to a private firm.”192  
According to Hovenkamp, “[t]oday the government could do 
something similar by requiring its departments and agencies 
to use open-source software as an alternative to Microsoft’s 
products.”193 
This would increase the open source software installed 
base, since governments are among the principal purchasers 
of software products.  It would help the economy move from a 
monopolized to a competitive computer platform network.  
The benefits for innovation could be particularly important, 
as recent studies have shown that innovation incentives 
(investments in applications) are sometimes greater for open 
source than for proprietary software platforms.194 Microsoft 
would be able to participate in the government bidding 
process as long as it offered an open source software product, 
either by developing new products or by making public the 
source code of Windows.  The exclusion of Microsoft from the 
auction process if it did not offer open source products or if it 
did not guarantee a wide interoperability with all existing or 
new formats may improve efficiency in two ways.  It may 
improve allocative efficiency, as the government would also 
be able to purchase software products at a lower price (not 
including remuneration for intellectual property rights), and 
dynamic efficiency, with increased competition between 
different products (assuming that a competitive market is 
better suited for innovation in software products than a 
monopolistic market).  Of course, any imposed restriction of 
software choice would also precipitate reductions in utility of 
government users, at least in the short run.  These utility 
 
192 HERBERT HOVENKAMP, THE ANTITRUST ENTERPRISE 302 (2005). 
193 Id. 
194 See, e.g., Nicholas Economides & Evangelos Katsamakas, Linux v. 
Windows: A Comparison of Application and Platform Innovation 
Incentives for Open Source and Proprietary Software Platforms, in THE 
ECONOMICS OF OPEN SOURCE SOFTWARE DEVELOPMENT 207 (Juergen Bitzer 
& Philip J.H. Schroeder eds., 2006). 
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losses of the Hovenkamp proposal have to be considered and 
balanced with the potential benefits outlined above.195 
The decision of the Brazilian government to switch from 
Microsoft proprietary software to open source software and 
to pass legislation making the use of open source software 
mandatory for governmental departments was reportedly 
aiming to force Microsoft to rethink its business model.196  
The German government has also adopted guidelines for 
federal, state, and local governments as well as other public 
sector agencies interested in migrating from Microsoft 
proprietary technology to open source software and signed 
contracts with IBM for computer systems based on Linux 
operating systems.197 
These initiatives may have influenced Microsoft’s 
progressive commitment with interoperability and probably 
led to the publication of the “interoperability principles.”198  
An example may be the interoperability of Microsoft’s 
formerly proprietary OOXML (Office Open XML file format), 
now a formal ISO standard,199 with the OpenDocument 
 
195 Additionally, it would be far reaching into the realm of industrial 
policy if the government specified a particular model of software 
development predicting what finished software products provide the 
greatest value per dollar spent.  If Microsoft were forced to make the 
Windows source code public, it would reduce Microsoft’s incentives to drive 
that product forward with new innovations as others could then offer 
essentially the same product for free, possibly only subject to the risk of 
patent infringement suits.  Also, there is no significant evidence that the 
open source model can become a replacement for for-profit software.  See 
Nicholas Economides & Evangelos Katsamakas, Two-Sided Competition of 
Proprietary vs. Open Source Technology Platforms and the Implications for 
the Software Industry, 52 MGMT. SCI. 1057 (2006); see also Economides & 
Katsamakas, supra note 194. 
196 See Steve Kingstone, Brazil Adopts Open-Source Software, BBC 
NEWS, June 2, 2005, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/business/4602325.stm. 
197 See IBM Signs Linux Deal with Germany, BBC NEWS, June 3, 
2002, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/business/2023127.stm. 
198 See Microsoft Corp., Interoperability Principles, http://www.micro 
soft.com/interop/principles/default.mspx (last visited Apr. 8, 2010). 
199 See Press Release, Int’l Org. for Standardization,  ISO/IEC DIS 
29500 Receives Necessary Votes for Approval as an International 
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Format (ODF) standard, which is supported by Sun 
Microsystems, IBM, Novell, Nokia, Intel, and Red Hat.  This 
led to the release of Microsoft Office 2007 service pack 2, a 
product that, according to Microsoft, “provides built-in 
support for more file formats than any other productivity 
suite on the market” and which comes with a “new 
programming interface that will make it easy for developers 
to make any other document format show up in the drop 
down menu and be selected by users as their default, putting 
it on a par with the major formats already supported in 
Office 2007.”200  This business culture evolution may have 
been provoked by the recent competition law challenges on 
interoperability and the use of public procurement as a way 
to increase competition in the marketplace.  The cumulative 
impact of these combined antitrust and non-antitrust 
remedies is outside the scope of this study and should be 
empirically examined. 
2. Standard Setting Organization and de Facto 
Versus de Jure Standardization 
The alleged de facto standardization of the Windows 
architecture work group computing environment or the 
Windows Media Player platform through the leveraging of 
Microsoft’s dominant position in the operating systems 
market was a development that both the European 
Commission and the General Court abhorred.201  The General 
 
Standard (Apr. 2, 2008), available at http://www.iso.org/iso/pressrelease. 
htm?refid= Ref1123. 
200 Posting of Tom Robertson to Microsoft on the Issues, http://micro 
softontheissues.com/cs/blogs/mscorp/archive/2009/04/28/following-through-
on-our-commitment-to-intero perability.aspx (Apr. 28, 2009, 09:06 EST) 
(last visited Apr. 8, 2010). 
201 See Case T-201/04, Microsoft Corp. v. Commission, 2007 E.C.R. II-
3601, ¶ 277.  The Commission noted that the position of Microsoft on the 
client PC operating systems market will enable it to “determine to a large 
extent and independently of its competitors the set of coherent 
communications rules that will govern the de facto standard for 
interoperability in work group networks.”  But note that standardization 
to WMA and WMV never occurred, but was assumed by the Commission to 
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Court was particularly clear that its reservations did not 
concern the process of standardization, which may provide 
benefits to consumers, but the way this de facto 
standardization took place in this particular case.  The Court 
noted that “[a]lthough, generally, standardization may 
effectively present certain advantages, it cannot be allowed 
to be imposed unilaterally by an undertaking in a dominant 
position by means of tying.”202  
A possible alternative is to delegate the task of developing 
interoperable standards to a standard-setting organization 
(SSO), which will assist the competition law authority or 
court in implementing interoperability requirements, 
although there might be competition law issues involved in 
the operation of the SSO.203  In this case, the standard will 
not emerge by a process of de facto standardization by a 
dominant firm but will be the outcome of negotiations.  The 
SSO’s activity will be closely monitored in order to avoid 
cartel-like behavior and deceptive conduct and to guarantee 
transparent and open procedures.204  However, this solution 
presents its own problems: the imbalance of power between 
Microsoft and its competitors in the standard setting body 
and the subsequent risk that the standard approved will not 
 
be later disproved in actuality.  Today, as well as before the imposition of 
the Windows-N remedy, WMA and WMV are not dominant media formats. 
202 Id. ¶¶ 526, 1152. 
203 See Press Release, Eur. Comm’n Antitrust: Commission Market 
Tests Commitments Proposed by Rambus Concerning Memory Chips 
(June 12, 2009), available at http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction. 
do?reference=MEMO/09/273&format=HTML&aged=0&language=EN&gui
Language=en. 
204 See Philip J. Weiser, Regulating Interoperability: Lessons from 
AT&T, Microsoft, and Beyond, 76 ANTITRUST L.J. 271, 298 (2009).  Note, 
however, the rejection of the “truth-in-standards” provisions suggested by 
the non-settling states by the D.C. Circuit on the ground that these were 
unrelated to the violation found.  The non-settling states would have 
required Microsoft to continue supporting any industry standard it has 
publicly claimed to support until it publicly disclaims such support, or the 
standard expires or is rescinded by the standard setting body, and to 
continue to support an industry standard any time it makes a proprietary 
alteration. 
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be “sufficiently” interoperable with competitors’ products.205 
Additionally, the standard setting process is slow and could 
thus retard innovation along some dimensions while 
accelerating it along others.  Furthermore, an agreement by 
competitors on a standard tends to restrict competition 
because competitors are limited largely to competing within 
the specific narrow confines of the standard.  Breakthrough 
innovation with alternative approaches tends not to occur 
because everyone is focused on implementation of the 
standard. 
V. THE NEED FOR A PRINCIPLE OF REMEDIAL 
PROPORTIONALITY 
The principle of proportionality constitutes an important 
limit to the European Commission’s discretion in imposing 
remedies.  It is explicitly provided in Article 7 of Regulation 
1/2003 that any behavioral or structural remedies imposed 
by the Commission must be proportionate to the 
infringement committed and necessary to bring the 
infringement effectively to an end.206  This provision mainly 
 
205 See Paul Meller, Microsoft's ISO Win May Raise Antitrust Issues, 
PCWORLD, Apr. 2, 2008, available at http://www.pcworld.com/article/ 
144036/microsofts _iso_win_may_raise_antitrust_issues.html.  The article 
details the recent investigation by the European Commission of the 
interoperability of OOXML, which was approved as an ISO-recognized 
international standard in April 2008.  However, there have been 
allegations which are currently being investigated by the European 
Commission that there have been irregularities or attempts to influence 
the vote at the European Committee for Standardization or the 
International Organization for Standardization, thus illustrating the 
difficulties of guaranteeing the transparency of the process. 
206 Council Regulation, supra note 12.  According to Article 7: 
1. Where the Commission, acting on a complaint or on its 
own initiative, finds that there is an infringement of 
Article 81 or of Article 82 of the Treaty, it may by decision 
require the undertakings and associations of undertakings 
concerned to bring such infringement to an end.  For this 
purpose, it may impose on them any behavioural or 
structural remedies which are proportionate to the 
infringement committed and necessary to bring the 
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relies on Article 3(1) of Regulation 17/62 (now replaced by 
Regulation 1/2003) that the remedies imposed should “not 
exceed what is appropriate” and should be “necessary to 
attain the objective sought, namely to restore compliance 
with the rules infringed.”207  Structural remedies are 
generally disfavored, and generally may only be applied if 
there is no equally effective behavioral remedy or if any 
equally effective behavioral remedy would be more 
burdensome for the targeted firm.208  Article 23(2) of the 
Regulation creates a quantitative measure of proportionality, 
providing that the Commission may not impose fines that 
exceed ten percent of a firm’s total turnover in the preceding 
business year (attempting to balance the magnitude of the 
anticompetitive harm against the harm the fine causes to the 
targeted firm).  In addition, when determining the amount of 
the fine, the court must consider the gravity and the 
duration of the infringement as well as the effect of the 
competition law infringement on the market.209  The General 
Court has also recently applied the principle of 
proportionality to commitment decisions adopted under 
Article 9 of Regulation 1/2003: In Alrosa, the Court held that 
“the voluntary nature of the commitments . . . does not 
 
infringement effectively to an end.  Structural remedies 
can only be imposed either where there is no equally 
effective behavioural remedy or where any equally effective 
behavioural remedy would be more burdensome for the 
undertaking concerned than the structural remedy.  If the 
Commission has a legitimate interest in doing so, it may 
also find that an infringement has been committed in the 
past. 
2. Those entitled to lodge a complaint for the purposes of 
paragraph 1 are natural or legal persons who can show a 
legitimate interest and Member States. 
207 See Case T-170/06, Alrosa Co. v. Commission, 2007 E.C.R. II-2601, 
¶ 102; Case T-338/94, Finnboard v. Commission, 1998 E.C.R. II-1617, ¶ 
242; Case T-76/89, ITP v. Commission, 1991 E.C.R. II-575, ¶ 93; Case T-
7/93, Langnese-Iglo v. Commission, 1995 E.C.R. II-1533, ¶ 209; Case T-
9/93, Schöller v. Commission, 1995 E.C.R. II-1611, ¶ 163. 
208 Council Regulation, supra note 12, at recital 12. 
209 See Joined Cases C-189/02 P, C-202/02 P, C-205–208/02 P, & C-
213/02 P, Dansk Rørindustri v. Commission, 2005 E.C.R. I-5425, ¶ 243. 
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relieve the Commission of the need to comply with the 
principle of proportionality, because it is the Commission’s 
decision which makes those commitments binding” and that 
“giving that commitment, the undertakings concerned 
merely assented, for their own reasons, to a decision which 
the Commission has empowered to adopt unilaterally.”210  
The Commission is subject to the same duty of applying the 
principle of proportionality in adopting Article 7 or 9 
decisions, which also requires, in the case of Article 9, “an 
appraisal in concreto of the viability of those intermediate 
solutions” that were not finally chosen by the Commission.211 
It is not clear if the Commission has appraised concretely 
in its Article 9 commitment decision in the Microsoft case the 
less onerous alternative remedies on offer, following the 
Alrosa precedent.212  In any case, the choice screen remedy 
imposed is subject to the requirement of proportionality, 
which raises the issue of what exactly this requirement 
entails. 
The principle of proportionality is defined in detail in 
Article 7 of Regulation 1/2003213 and in the competition law 
jurisprudence of the European courts.214  In order to satisfy 
the principle of proportionality, “measures adopted by 
Community institutions [must] not exceed the limits of what 
is appropriate and necessary in order to attain the legitimate 
objectives pursued by the legislation in question; when there 
 
210 Case T-170/06, Alrosa Co. v. Commission, 2007 E.C.R. II-2601 ¶¶ 
105–106, appeal docketed, Case C-441/07 P, Commission v. Alrosa Co. 
211 Id. ¶ 156.  The proportionality test is not thus limited to the 
abstract examination of the reasonableness of the specific final measure 
but also looks to the concrete existence of less restrictive (to the 
undertaking’s freedom of action) ways of achieving the same purposes 
(intermediary solutions).  But see Op. Advocate Gen., Case C-441/07 P, 
Commission v. Alrosa Co., not yet published, ¶ 62 (arguing the contrary 
position). 
212 Case T-170/06, Alrosa Co. v. Commission, 2007 E.C.R. II-2601. 
213 See Council Regulation, supra note 12. 
214 Case T-170/06, Alrosa Co. v. Commission, 2007 E.C.R. II-2601, ¶ 
98.  See also Case T-260/94, Air Inter v. Commission, 1997 E.C.R. II-997; 
Case T-65/98, Van den Bergh Foods v. Commission, 2003 E.C.R. II-4653, ¶ 
201. 
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is a choice between several appropriate measures, recourse 
must be had to the least onerous, and the disadvantages 
caused must not be disproportionate to the aims pursued.”215  
Proportionality is also a general principle of European Union 
law, applying as such to all measures adopted by European 
Union institutions.  According to settled case law, “by virtue 
of that principle, the lawfulness of the prohibition of an 
economic activity is subject to the condition that the 
prohibitory measures are appropriate and necessary in order 
to achieve the objectives legitimately pursued by the 
legislation in question; when there is a choice between 
several appropriate measures, recourse must be had to the 
least onerous, and the disadvantages caused must not be 
disproportionate to the aims pursued.”216  This three-prong 
proportionality test limits the discretion of the European 
Commission in adopting appropriate remedies.  In that 
sense, proportionality differs from a cost-benefit analysis, 
which would focus only on the gravity of harm and the 
alternative remedies that might have been imposed.  Under 
a cost-benefit analysis, a remedy would be disproportionate 
when its costs and burdens outweigh its likely benefit of 
restoring competition or when its costs would be more 
important than an alternative remedy, which would have 
also been equally effective.  But proportionality may also 
take into account other issues, such as the degree of judicial 
deference to the Commission’s decision, as “the 
appropriateness of and the need for the contested decision 
must be assessed in relation to the aim pursued by the 
institution.”217  Although the principle of remedial 
proportionality does not exist as such in United States 
antitrust law, a constitutional proportionality requirement 
 
215  Op. Advocate Gen., Case C-441/07 P, Commission v. Alrosa Co., ¶ 
46. 
216 Case C-331/88, The Queen v Minister of Agric., Fisheries and Food 
ex parte Fedesa, 1990 E.C.R. I-4023, ¶ 13. 
217 Case T-170/06, Alrosa Co. v. Commission, 2007 E.C.R. II-2601, ¶ 
99. 
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applies to most punitive damages cases as well as to other 
types of remedies.218 
The first prong of the proportionality principle is of 
particular interest for our purposes.  In order that the 
remedy be appropriate and necessary, the Commission must 
identify both the magnitude and scope (amount) of the harm 
to consumers/competition and the type of violation.  “Type of 
violation” means both the specific competition law category 
(i.e., a refusal to deal, a tying case, an exclusive dealing 
case), and also the theory of harm advanced in the specific 
case (i.e., maintenance of monopoly, leveraging, essential 
facilities).219  The importance of remedial fit is often stressed 
by antitrust law literature.220  It relates to the causation link 
between the anticompetitive conduct and the theory of harm, 
which has, as the DC Circuit held in the US Microsoft case, 
“more purchase in connection with the appropriate remedy 
issue” than with the substantive issue of the establishment 
of the liability of the undertaking for an infringement of 
competition law.221  
It is clear that remedies should be effective, in the sense 
that they should aim “to re-establish the competitive 
situation, i.e., the competitive process that would have 
prevailed but for the infringement.”222  However, it is also 
 
218 See generally E. THOMAS SULLIVAN, PROPORTIONALITY PRINCIPLES IN 
AMERICAN LAW (2008); Tracy A. Thomas, Proportionality and the Supreme 
Court’s Jurisprudence of Remedies, 59 HASTINGS L.J. 73 (2007). 
219 See Ioannis Lianos, Categorical Thinking in Competition Law and 
the “Effects-Based” Approach in Article 82 EC, in ARTICLE 82 EC: 
REFLECTIONS ON ITS RECENT EVOLUTION 19 (Ariel Ezrachi ed., 2009). 
220 See Thomas O. Barnett, Section 2 Remedies: What to Do After 
Catching the Tiger by the Tail, 76 ANTITRUST L. J. 31, 36 (2009) (“[T]he 
remedy needs to be tied closely to the anticompetitive conduct occasioning 
it.  That means that remedies need to be sufficient, but not overbroad, and 
proportional to the offense”); Gregory J. Werden, Remedies for 
Exclusionary Conduct Should Protect and Preserve the Competitive 
Process, 76 ANTITRUST L. J. 65, 65 (2009) (“[R]emedies for exclusionary 
conduct should arise organically out of the theory of the case”) (citing 
LAURENCE A. SULLIVAN, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF ANTITRUST 146 (1977)). 
221 United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34, 80 (D.C. Cir. 2001). 
222 Per Hellström, Frank Maier-Rigaud, & Friedrich Wenzel Bulst, 
Remedies in European Antitrust Law, 76 ANTITRUST L.J. 43, 58 (2009). 
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clear that the principle of proportionality requires a close fit 
between the harm and the remedy.  The suggestion that 
remedies may go beyond “mirroring the abuse” profoundly 
misunderstands the relation between the remedy and the 
right it is attempting to protect.223  One could conceive the 
right as being distinct from the provision of the remedies for 
violation of that right—in other words that there is a 
dichotomy between rights and remedies, each concept being 
conceptually isolated from the other.  This formalistic 
position might lead the Commission and the national courts 
applying E.U. competition law not to impose any remedies 
for the infringement of a right (or wrong committed) or to 
impose stricter remedies than the nature and effect of the 
violation of the right would have required.  For example, a 
remedy that would go beyond simply “mirroring the abuse” 
and would “give the infringer’s competitors an advantage 
over the infringer in order to restore the competitive 
process”224 goes beyond the wrong committed because of the 
abusive conduct. Such a punishment could eventually 
jeopardize the dominant position of the firm, which would be 
conceived as antithetical  to the principle of the “competitive 
process,” the dominant firm having the ability to behave 
independently from its competitors.  However, Article 102 
does not condemn dominant positions as such, nor does it 
restrict a dominant firm’s ability to compete on the merits, 
as long as that situation does not qualify as an abuse.225  
Remedies that go beyond mirroring the specific abuse could 
certainly be adopted in theory, but that should be done 
either by advancing an additional theory of harm/liability 
under Article 102 that is more directly linked to the remedy 
 
223 Id. at 59. 
224 Id. 
225 Id.  The authors’ reasoning is based on an internal contradiction.  
They argue that remedies may go beyond mirroring the abuse, but at the 
same time, they qualify their statement by recognizing that the remedy 
“should not undermine the infringer's incentive to compete on the merits.”  
Id.  However, this is not very different from advancing that the remedy 
should mirror the abuse.  Indeed, if the dominant firm competes on the 
merits, there is no abuse. 
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sought or by employing another competition law instrument 
than Article 102.226 
An alternative view would be to consider that rights and 
remedies are profoundly interlinked with each other, so that 
the remedy is the measure of the right.  This profoundly 
legal realist view would consider that “the nature of the 
remedy sought in an antitrust case is often an important 
clue to the soundness of the antitrust claim” (the “if you 
cannot fix it, it isn’t broken” argument).227  Between these 
two poles, there is the principle of remedial proportionality, 
which we defend as being normatively desirable and 
recognized by positive law.  Without adopting a strict 
dichotomy between the identification of the right (or the 
liability step) and the remedy, the principle of 
proportionality requires a close link between the two.  In an 
economically informed interpretation of Article 102 this 
would require a fit between the theory of harm or the type of 
abuse and the remedy imposed: in the Microsoft case, a more 
explicit causal connection between the tying abuse category 
and the choice screen remedy that will eventually apply. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
The success or the failure of the remedial action in the 
United States and the E.U. Microsoft case is still, five years 
after the D.C. Circuit decision on remedies in the United 
States and since the Commission’s Decision, a matter of 
controversy.228  Some tend to link the alleged failure of the 
remedy, or its unexpected costs and scope, with the issue of 
 
226 A broader theory of abuse (and consumer harm) under Article 102 
TFEU that would have a direct link with the remedies sought could be one 
option to deal with the problem in this case.  Sector inquiries with the 
possibility of imposing effective remedies, market investigation references 
or a provision equivalent to Section 5 of the FTC Act could also be 
adequate tools in this case. 
227 Brunswick Corp. v. Riegel Textile Corp., 752 F.2d 261, 267 (7th Cir. 
1984). 
228 Compare Carl Shapiro, Microsoft: A Remedial Failure, 75 
ANTITRUST L.J. 739 (2009), with Keith N. Hylton, Remedies, Antitrust Law 
and Microsoft: Comment on Shapiro, 75 ANTITRUST L.J. 773 (2009). 
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liability, professing what has been known as “if you cannot 
fix it, it isn’t broken.”  Although it is clear that, in principle, 
the costs of remedies should not outweigh the consumer 
benefit they achieve, we contend that plaintiffs employ a 
sequential information model that addresses one issue at a 
time.  It would be therefore inappropriate to dismiss a case 
simply because the plaintiff did not identify an adequate 
remedy.  Harry First rightly observes “it seems inevitable 
that plaintiffs will refine their case as they learn more in the 
course of the litigation process,” in particular in high tech 
industries where technological change is so complex and 
rapid that there is a need for quick action.229 
At the same time, the litigation process is cheap 
compared to competition in price or product development.  
Thus, rivals have significant incentives to sue global 
dominant firms on multiple grounds and in multiple 
jurisdictions with the expectation that some suit will 
ultimately be successful in some jurisdiction.  And, 
sometimes, one or more of these cases is picked up and 
pursued by an antitrust authority, as it happened with the 
two cases against Microsoft, one in the United States and 
one in the E.U.  To some extent, the lack of fully-thought-
through remedies in both of these cases is a consequence of 
the history of the cases: they were started by allegations of 
rivals who were primarily interested in improving their 
competitive position vis-à-vis the dominant firm rather than 
remedying all the consequences of anti-competitive behavior. 
The anticompetitive effects of these practices were clearly 
identified and a dominant narrative emerged as a 
retrospective rationalization of different practices and 
strategies adopted by Microsoft that harmed consumers: the 
maintenance of monopoly story in the United States case and 
the leveraging story in the E.U. case.  The identification of a 
specific consumer harm story could operate as a limit to the 
identification of adequate remedies.  Antitrust liability 
stories transcend the different stages of a case, including the 
issue of remedies that need to address the specific consumer 
 
229 First, supra note 87, at 31. 
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harm.  The United States Microsoft case was problematic in 
this respect as there wasn’t a direct link between the 
antitrust liability story of maintenance of monopoly and the 
forward-looking remedies adopted.  It is clear that Microsoft 
executives were concerned by the potential (but unlikely) 
erosion of the Windows’ platform ubiquity from the joint 
actions of Sun and Java.  The competitive threat to Windows 
did not materialize, but Microsoft raised the walls of its 
fortress preventively in order to defend its position from 
Java’s and Sun’s naval attack, if one employs Carl Schapiro’s 
fortress metaphor.230  But, is it legitimate to require 
dominant firms to bring down the walls of their fortress or to 
keep them at the same level they were before, when they 
identify, perhaps wrongly, the existence of a potential threat 
of attack?  Lowering the wall some centimeters will certainly 
be an option, but the question will be how much lower and 
for what reason. 
In comparison, the narrative of the first European 
Microsoft case fits better with the remedies imposed.  The 
issue here was that the dominant firm was using an existing 
fort to attack a new area and extend its fortification.  The 
dominant firm would have thus been able to reinforce the 
defenses of its existing fort and to increase the risks for those 
attacking it.  The remedy in this case seems more 
straightforward in comparison to the previous setting: 
terminating the extension of the fortification will bring the 
end of both the ambition to reinforce the existing 
fortifications and to occupy a new area. 
What this metaphor shows is that the choice of the 
adequate narrative among different consumer harm stories 
should explain/correspond to the remedy sought.  This was 
certainly the case with the E.U. Microsoft case but not with 
the United States Microsoft case, where the difficulty in 
convincing the courts to accept the leveraging argument, as 
well as the change of the administration and possibly the re-
 
230 Shapiro, supra note 175, at 747. 
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framing of the government’s claim,231 led to the development 
of a narrative (maintenance of monopoly) that had only an 
indirect link with the bulk of the forward-looking remedies 
that were finally imposed. 
This mismatch between the consumer harm 
story/narrative and the remedy sought is also manifest in 
E.U. Microsoft II.  Although the Commission seemed to 
advance a consumer harm story based on the relatively 
favorable case law on tying, which establishes some form of 
quasi per-se illegality of tying if a company has a dominant 
position, the choice screen commitment accepted by the 
Commission as an adequate remedy for the competition 
problem does not address directly this particular risk of 
abuse.  Unbundling would seem to be the most appropriate 
remedy for a leveraging/tying concern.  However, the 
Commission reacted negatively when Microsoft decided to 
unbundle Internet Explorer from Windows 7-E.  The choice 
screen remedy which was ultimately adopted fits more with 
an essential facilities case, where Windows would have been 
considered indispensable for the distribution of an Internet 
browser.  We do not criticize the remedy per se, since it could 
prove to be effective in terms of reinvigorating competition in 
the Internet browser market, but rather the apparent 
conceptual mismatch between the consumer harm story and 
the remedy.  It would be particularly damaging for the 
development of competition law and economic growth in 
general if plaintiffs could employ the less demanding (in 
terms of a standard of proof) theory of consumer harm in 
order to achieve the most far reaching remedies (in terms of 
commitments from a dominant firm).  The problem cannot be 
solved by the characterization of the Microsoft case as a 
strictly “tying” case.  The classification of abuses under 
Article 102 is not a clear-cut exercise, and there is always a 
 
231 Harry First & Andrew I. Gavil, Re-Framing Windows: The Durable 
Meaning of the Microsoft Antitrust Litigation, UTAH L. REV. 679, 682 
(2006). 
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fine conceptual line that distinguishes different categories of 
abuses if one takes an effects-based approach.232 
 
 
 
232 See Ioannis Lianos, in ARTICLE 82 EC: REFLECTIONS ON ITS RECENT 
EVOLUTION, supra note 219, at 19. 
